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Abstract 
The trend towards delegating data processing and management to a remote party raises major concerns 
related to privacy violations for both end-users and service providers. These concerns have attracted the 
attention of the research community, and several techniques have been proposed to protect against malicious 
parties by providing secure communication protocols. Most of the proposed techniques, however, require the 
involvement of a third party, and this by itself can be viewed as another security concern. These security 
breaches can be avoided by following an innovative approach that depends on data sorted, managed, and 
stored in encrypted form at the remote servers. To realize such an approach, the encryption cryptosystem 
must support algebraic operations over encrypted data. This cryptosystem can be effective in protecting data 
and supporting the construction of programs that can process encrypted input and produce encrypted output. 
In fact, the latter programs do not decrypt the input, and therefore, they can be run by an un-trusted party 
without revealing their data and internal states. Furthermore, such programs prove to be practical in 
situations where we need to outsource private computations, especially in the context of cloud computing. 
Homomorphic cryptosystems are perfectly aligned with these objectives as they are a strong foundation for 
schemes that allow a blind processing of encrypted data without the need to decrypt them. In this dissertation 
we rely on homomorphic encryption schemes to secure cloud computing, services and routing protocols. We 
design several circuits that allow for the blind processing and management of data such that malicious 
parties are denied access to sensitive information. We select five different areas to apply our models to. 
These models are then easily customized for many other areas. We also provide prototypes that we use to 
study the performance and robustness of our models. Finally, we set our objectives for future research 
directions. 
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Chapter 1  
 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The popularity of public networks, especially the Internet, and the unprecedented growth in their 
users has raised major security concerns, especially in terms of users’ privacy. The risks of 
violating users’ privacy exacerbate when we consider the growing trend towards using smart 
devices, the emergence of cloud services, and the interest in mobility solutions. These trends 
require full collaboration between clients, service providers and web hosts to form a solid 
foundation for a secure environment. This environment should implement sufficient security 
measures that can prevent intruders from performing a diverse range of malicious actions. 
Among the known approaches to support security are the usage of encryption/decryption 
techniques, key sharing, third party delegation, and blind processing. These approaches aim at 
hardening the communication system by combining cryptographic theory and secure 
computations. Having a secure communication system paves the way for a huge body of 
applications that require high levels of privacy preservation, like bank transactions and medical 
applications. In other words, taking security aspects into consideration when designing any 
communication system, reflects into high trust in these systems, and encourages people to utilize 
them. 
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1.2 Motivation 
Since the publication of the RSA encryption scheme in 1978, computations on encrypted values 
have attracted a valuable attention. This type of encryption is an effective approach for data 
protection since processors do not need to decrypt inputs before performing the requested 
operations. However, most of the proposed protection schemes that aim at extending the 
homomorphic encryption basic model were suffering from a lack of flexibility, and have 
supported only a limited number of arithmetic operations. Recently, a Fully Homomorphic 
Encryption Scheme (FHES) has been proposed by Gentry to support an exhaustive number of 
operations with high flexibility [GEN09a]. This novel encryption/decryption method not only 
help preventing malicious parties from accessing private information, but also makes it possible 
to develop a rich collection of practical secure applications. We adopt FHE schemes in this thesis 
to develop strong foundations for different kind of applications. Although innovative in their 
concept, these schemes are still time consuming and show a modest performance. We are 
motivated by the fact that these schemes are under the scope of extensive research efforts to 
improve their performance. We expect that these shortcomings can be bypassed given the 
advancements achieved in hardware capabilities.  
1.3 Objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to develop foundations and design generic circuits, easily 
customizable, that can effectively preserve the privacy and confidentiality in various 
applications. These applications span over five areas of research: 
1. Database and applications. 
2. Processors and remote program execution. 
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3. Location Based Services and mobility solutions. 
4. Ad-hoc wireless networks and their dynamic collaborations. 
5. Video streaming through public networks and secure purchasing protocols.  
1.4 Contributions 
The main research contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
1. We have re-designed basic database queries using the Homomorphic Encryption Scheme 
(HES). This is accomplished through defining circuits as well as employing a novel 
obfuscation technique to service requests appropriately. This has enabled us to establish a 
secure collaborative mode with which queries are blindly processed without giving 
unauthorized parties any access to the data of interest. 
2. We have presented an encrypted processor that allows executing programs without revealing 
their details and internals. This processor is based on a novel logical gate called the Star. The 
Star protects the program content by hiding the gates that are being executed at a specific 
time instant. This means that our novel processor can be forced to execute binaries without 
the need to disclose any information.  
3. We have built a secure architecture for Location Based Services to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our aforementioned novel work. We have used FHES to develop circuits that 
can process client queries anonymously, and find the requested point of interests without 
knowing the exact locations of those users. Moreover, our proposed solution can combine 
plain and encrypted records such that servers do not need to encrypt their databases to 
support such a topology. On the other hand, the results returned to the requesting client will 
be implicitly encrypted by performing operations between plain and cipher text. That is, only 
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the requester can decrypt the returned locations. Our architecture can be easily extended to 
serve other applications (especially in the context of mobility solutions). 
4. We have developed a secure mechanism for information exchange in ad-hoc wireless 
networks. These networks suffer from major security vulnerabilities due to their dynamic 
nature. We have proposed circuits that allow nodes to share their experience, and evaluate 
their in-neighbors without disclosing any confidential information publicly. This way a 
secure routing process can be guaranteed and trusted routes can be established without 
involving any malicious or suspicious nodes over those routes. 
5. We have developed a fully secure mechanism that establishes a secure protocol between 
video requesters and service providers. This protocol allows each party to collaborate with 
the other without violating their privacy. This protocol answers the increased demands for 
video streaming and the lack of security in the available systems to support this popular 
application.  
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we show main reasons of loss 
of privacy in Internet as well as how to provide a secure use. Then, in Chapter 3, we present the 
scheme adopted in our work, and survey related works that aim at securing sensitive 
applications. In Chapter 4, we describe our proposal to re-design and protect SQL queries such 
that a secure database system is achieved. Chapter 5 details our novel technique for blind 
program execution. In Chapter 6, we propose an efficient secure solution to support Location 
Based Services. Next, within Chapters 7 and 8 we provide a description for circuits designed to 
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achieve secure routing for ad-hoc wireless networks and streaming protocols, respectively. 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes our thesis report and provides future research directions. 
1.6 List of Publications 
1.6.1 Articles in Referred Journals 
1. Y. Gahi, M. Guennoun, Z. Guennoun, and K. El-khatib. Privacy Preserving Scheme for 
Location-Based Services. In Journal of Information Security, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012.  
2. Y. Gahi, M. Guennoun, Z. Guennoun, and K. El-khatib, "On the use of homomorphic 
encryption to secure applications, services, and routing protocols," In The European Journal 
Of  Scientific Research, Vol. 88, No. 3, 2012. 
3. Y. Gahi, M. Guennoun, Z. Guennoun, and K. El-khatib, " Securing Internet Applications 
using Homomorphic Encryption Schemes," In The Journal of Theoretical and Applied 
Information Technology, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2013. 
1.6.2 Articles in Referred Conference Proceedings 
4. Y. Gahi, M. Guennoun, and K. El-khatib, “A Secure Database System using Homomorphic 
Encryption Schemes,” In the 3rd Int. Conf. on Advances in Databases, Knowledge, and Data 
Applications, pp. 54-58, St. Maarten, The Netherlands Antilles, 2011. 
5. Y. Gahi, M. Guennoun, Z. Guennoun, and K. El-khatib, “Encrypted Processes for Oblivious 
Data Retrieval”, In The 6th IEEE Int. Conf. for Internet Technology and Secured 
Transactions, pp. 514-518,  Abu Dhabi, 2011. 
6. Y. Gahi, M. Guennoun, Z. Guennoun, and K. El-khatib, "A Fully Private Video on-Demand 
Service," In The 25th IEEE annual Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, pp. 1-5, Montreal, Canada, 2012. 
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7. Y. Gahi, M. Guennoun, Z. Guennoun, and K. El-khatib, "An encrypted trust based routing 
protocol,” In The 2012 IEEE Conference on Open Systems, pp. 1-4, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 2012.  
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Chapter 2  
 
 
The Loss of Privacy 
2.1 Introduction 
In its beginning, the Internet was mainly introduced to interconnect systems and laboratories that 
are committed to government research [LEI09].  
As years passed, the main goal of using the Internet has expanded to allow billions of users to 
connect with one another regardless of their affiliations, see Figure2-1. Hence, nowadays, the 
Internet is referred to as the worldwide interconnection of people over individual networks that 
can be led by private parties, industries, or governments.  
 
Figure 2-1: Internet usage by regions 
(1)
. 
(1) Miniwatts Makreting Group 
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This tremendous growth played an important role in making computer-based information 
systems, or even more specifically online-based systems, ubiquitous [VEE04]. This means that 
these elements are highly used in both individuals’ and businesses’ daily transactions. It is 
actually noteworthy that this technological revolution brought many advantages that can be as 
simple as easing the process of communication between people, or as complex as handling huge 
e-commerce companies’ day-to-day operations. However, its drawbacks can be more harmful 
than individuals can ever expect. One of the most dangerous threats is the loss of online privacy 
and confidentiality [GHO13]. 
In the digital age, Internet privacy refers to many concepts depending on people’s perceptions. 
Some of us are more concerned about controlling their social networks, others are more anxious 
about the extent to which companies track their behavior whenever they browse different 
websites, while some people may even worry about governments monitoring their online 
activities. In other words, Internet privacy entails two major aspects:  
 The personal information that identifies an individual such as their home address or 
phone number, and  
 The non-identifying information like the specific behavior of people while surfing the 
Internet. 
2.2 Importance of Internet Privacy 
Online privacy is actually a sensitive matter because of the increasing number of Internet users 
as well as the threats that menace them 
(2)
. It is important to be aware of the existence of a large  
(2) Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic report, 2008 [URL03] 
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number of hackers and stalkers that aim at violating the users’ privacy and benefit from an 
unauthorized access to their undisclosed personal information. This unwanted behavior can, not 
only damage one’s privacy, but also be a major source of financial and social worries. In order to 
be convinced why it is extremely important to safeguard Internet privacy, one should be aware of 
the various risks and dangers that are raised whenever and whatever an unsecure Internet access 
occurs.  
It is common to notice that while advertising, websites target Internet users based on their 
interests. In order to do so, these websites should have access to their data and, sometimes, 
private information. Some are satisfied because they only see the advertising banners that appeal 
to them, however, this matter is not fully as innocent as it seems. The real issue is raised when 
these parties share the information they have with other entities without the users’ knowledge or 
agreement. This leads us to examine more the available Internet privacy issues that threaten 
people while using the Internet. Some of the privacy threats consist of the unauthorized network 
access, hacking, phishing, email fraud and spamming. Among these elements, hacking is the 
most used technique to acquire people’s information and harm them [HAT12]. Once a party 
hacks users’ data, they have complete control over how this information can be utilized and can 
misuse it for illegal or irrational purposes, see Figure2-2 and Figure2-3 for some statistics about 
web application security and hack techniques as well as the cost of cybercrime attacks for 
different countries during 2012.  
Many examples can illustrate how people are exposed to Internet privacy loss, such as the case 
when the Internet Service Provider (ISP) can have full access to the users’ information simply by 
tracking their online activities and behavior. 
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Figure 2-2: 2012 Web Application Security Vulnerability Population 
(3)
. 
 
Figure 2-3: The cost of cybercrime for different countries 
(4)
. 
2.3 Causes of Privacy Loss 
The growth of Internet along with the improvement of its different features and advantages has 
heightened many issues regarding online privacy of the users. Particularly, online users’ fear 
 
(3) Cenzic Application Vulnerability Trends Report 2013 [URL04]  
(4) Norton Cybercrime Report 2012 [URL05] 
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includes the propagation of databases, the likelihood of online privacy loss and violation, as well 
as the misuse of the personal information that has been collected. The general causes that have 
contributed to the increasing of these fears involve the lack of official and legal frameworks that 
can play an important role into counteracting the offensive behavior of technology. Moreover, 
the fact that the increasing media publicity promotes the Internet usage as a flawless tool that can 
easily be used by people. It is rarely mentioned that different threats are awaiting the surfers of 
the Internet. In addition to these causes, the most dangerous one remains the fact that not all 
people are aware of privacy issues. Usually, people do not have the required knowledge that can 
protect them from falling into the trap of losing all their personal information, or worse, suffering 
from social and financial implications because of the different existing Internet frauds. 
Currently, the approximate overall cost for the different cyber crimes is measured in billions, see 
Figure 2-3. Even if many institutions have invested in both the development and implementation 
of different measures that can help improve Internet security, computer and Internet misuse is 
unfortunately expected to keep being a problem as years pass.  
The information system professionals are more anxious regarding the propagation of the 
unethical and unwanted behavior that may occur while making use of computers that are 
connected to the Internet. This fear is due to the fact that it can negatively affect both the society 
and the information system profession.  
2.4 How to Deal with Online Privacy Loss 
Once Internet users build a strong understanding about the dangerous online privacy issues, and 
are aware of the many threats that menace them, such as the fact that some websites generate 
their official revenues only by selling private information to other entities, they should be willing 
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to wholeheartedly welcome protection from such threats and risks. No user would want to see 
their private data spread over the web and have no control over who can view the shared 
information. That’s why online users must be vigilant whenever they are ready to surf the web. 
Many perspectives can be considered while viewing Internet privacy protection measures. These 
perceptions range from the individual’s adoption of simple behavior that allow them to control 
the private data that they share on the Internet and the different policies and regulations that 
exist, to the complex technological measures that can be acquired [QUI07, RAJ12, LU07]. 
Combining all these online privacy protection perceptions allows all users to be sure that their 
private pieces of information are successfully protected to a large degree and less likely to be 
compromised. 
If we examine the behavior of an Internet user regarding what information he/she publishes and 
shares with the public over the web, we notice that the individual’s control plays an extremely 
important role in protecting his/her privacy. A good behavior, combined with some extra 
cautions, contributes in effectively safeguarding any private information from malicious entities. 
Before they even consider sharing their private information on a website, users must be fully 
aware of its credibility. Within the same context, avoiding opening the links that are received 
from anonymous sources can spare many privacy loss or troubles because they may contain 
spyware that secretly collects sensitive data and automatically sends it to external, harmful 
people. 
In order to reduce privacy loss or fraud, many policies and regulations are set to control and 
supervise the different usages of personal information that is submitted to a given organization, 
such as the companies that embed the e-commerce as part of their services. In this latter example, 
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the users should be fully aware that some employers have access to their sensitive information 
while trying to ensure the service that they first requested. However, specific restrictions are set 
to specify to which degree the user’s data can be used. In general, similar websites and 
organizations clearly state their policies and share them with users. Legal actions can be taken 
against any organization that does not respect the agreement or the policies about the usage of 
the user’s private information.  
Finally, Internet users must know that different technological tools were developed in order to 
contribute in the process of securing the user’s online private data and prevent privacy loss 
[MAR07, XU12, and GUO02]. There is a countless number of online protection software that 
put together all the required packages (anti-spyware, firewalls, data encryption functionalities 
and setting…etc) that help the users preserve their anonymity. Making use of all of these 
elements may allows the users to protect their sensitive information and prevent any privacy loss 
issues. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Nowadays, the Internet is considered as the largest information container and the most used 
means of communication. Promoting the social networking features, emailing and blogging have 
all effectively and efficiently contributed to easing, moving forward and improving the human 
being’s life. This wonderful resource made the whole world looks like a smaller place where 
billions of people live. However, with the tremendous growth of the Internet, many issues were 
raised to harm and threaten the most sensitive information about the users: their privacy!  
It is extremely important to be aware of the different dangers that can face the Internet users 
whenever they try to connect to the external world through a public network. One must be also 
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aware of the different parties that present a potential fraud and should know how to deal with 
them. These malicious entities can be hackers, stalkers or third party users. They all aim at 
extracting sensitive and private data probably in order to make malicious use of it.  
Finally, all Internet users must know the exact approaches that can help them secure their privacy 
and make use of them. As explained above, they can either make use of the policies and 
regulations, install the available software that secure their sensitive data, or simply control the 
information that they share with the public. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Survey of Related Work 
This chapter provides a survey of prior work that is related to the problem we tackle in this 
thesis. First, we exhibit practical and popular applications/systems and highlight the lack of 
privacy and confidentiality support in them. This lack of security support contributes to the 
decrease in the number of users of these applications. Then we study different models and 
techniques that have been proposed to secure these applications/systems. We shed the light on 
the strengths and limitations of these proposals and discuss how to enhance them such that they 
keep pace with the rapid development in technology. Finally, we elaborate on the fully 
homomorphic encryption concept and demonstrate how it can be utilized to support security 
effectively. We also discuss our main contribution that aim at involving and customizing this 
novel encryption technique to realize fully private prototypes that are able to secure real-life 
applications. 
3.1 Introduction 
In the recent years, Internet services and related applications have experienced a notable 
development and a massive growth in the number of users, see Figure2-1 for the distribution of 
users by world regions. These trends have benefited from the enhancements in hardware 
capabilities and the popularity of smart phones, Wi-Fi networks, GPS, as well as mobility 
solutions.  
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Although these systems provide a portfolio of facilities, they are usually accompanied with a set 
of security risks like, piracy, tracking, and monitoring, and these risks often indicate a violation 
to the privacy. Therefore, security aspects should be obeyed in order to protect end-users. 
Researchers have followed different approaches to secure sensitive applications. Supporting 
security requires paying careful attention to the following aspects: 
1. Confidentiality and Integrity: Data confidentiality is an important aspect of security. It refers 
to that certain parties are denied access to the data unless they have passed certain 
authorization procedures. This authorization is often achieved based on cryptographic 
techniques, whereby information is actually protected by using encryption/decryption keys. 
However, confidentiality only guarantees that data is not accessible for unauthorized parties; 
another concept is needed to guarantee that the data is not altered or tampered with; this 
concept is called the integrity. The latter basically complements confidentiality to ensure that 
the accessed data is fully protected from unauthorized alterations that may cause a major 
breach to the accessed system. 
2. Authenticity: Authentication has an essential factor to support information security. It 
actually maintains and controls the access of authorized users to the services they registered 
for. Authentication can be realized and controlled by cryptographic keys, digital signatures, 
certificate authority… etc.  
3. Performance: The time-consuming tasks of security algorithms have enticed a major interest 
in the research community. Although securing the different applications is a necessity, 
security algorithms are known to consume excessive time periods, and this leads to 
degradation in systems’ efficiency. Hence, there should be a balance between the level of 
protection required and the delays that can be tolerated. 
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The efficiency of a protected system mainly depends on these aspects and the attention given to 
them at the design stage. However, since systems and applications have diverse requirements and 
applications, they will definitely differ in the level of security we can achieve in them. That is, it 
is not practical to work on fulfilling all of the abovementioned aspects, and certain aspects will 
get more focus than others. Therefore, we survey in this chapter different security techniques that 
have been proposed in the literature to serve certain applications. The survey focuses mainly on 
how the privacy is preserved in the systems provided. After that, we present our new solution 
that is based on the FHE scheme, and we provide a comparison between our solution and the 
surveyed proposals.  
3.2 Overview of Security in Internet Applications 
3.2.1 Database and Applications 
Different security techniques have been devised for relational databases. These techniques can be 
organized into three categories: encryption, distribution techniques and access control modules. 
These techniques attempt to satisfy the requirements of database security that include the 
protection of privacy, data loss avoidance, and the prevention of unauthorized accesses. These 
requirements have been defined in [SHM10]. In this latter, the data to be protected have been 
split into three categories: 
 Data in use: The data that exists in the memory of the database which is often more 
important than the data existing in the hard disc. 
 Data in motion: The flow of data between both the client and the database server. 
 Data at rest: The database stored files. 
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Shmueli et al. [SHM10] have also categorized attackers into three classes: The intruders, which 
are external users that gain access to the database, the insiders, which belong to the system and 
threaten other users, and the malicious administrators, which track the system to extract private 
information from it. In what follows, we discuss the different security techniques proposed under 
the abovementioned categories.  
3.2.1.1 Encryption 
Encryption is an effective approach to secure databases. With this approach, database records are 
encrypted and communications with the database server are made using encrypted queries. 
Encryption techniques have been widely adopted in the literature as a means to avoid third 
parties’ intervention in the communications between database servers and their clients (see 
Figure 3-1). Examples of encryption techniques are provided in what follows. 
Yin et al. have proposed in [YIN09] an encryption technique based on mathematical 
transformation. The objective of this technique is to modify the query behavior such that clients 
interact with the database server in a blind fashion. In the same direction, Popa et al. have 
presented two mechanisms [POP11]. The first mechanism executes a query over encrypted data 
to extract the suitable records. The second mechanism is an adjustable technique that customizes 
encryption scheme according to each query to avoid revealing encryption possibilities.  
In another context, Yan and Zhang in [YAN11a] use the homomorphic concept (which we detail 
later in this thesis) to propose a private homomorphic algorithm that acts on real numbers and 
supports the different arithmetic operations: addition, multiplication, subtraction and division. 
The authors have also proposed another mechanism called IOT-MW. This mechanism is 
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responsible for encrypting/decrypting the content and monitoring queries to support 
communication with encrypted fields.  
 
Figure 3-1: Encrypted database architecture without third parties. 
Qi-chun has tackled in [QIC09] the problem of executing encrypted queries while considering 
the time consumed in encrypting the databases. The work in this paper is based on the 
exponential algorithm and ASCII transformation to reconstruct a new index depending on the 
query inputs. Then, any record of character type is converted to a larger integer before 
considering only four bytes of the final converted record. This is meant to achieve a significant 
decrease in the time needed to perform the query.  
The authors in [PAG11] and [RAY11] have followed an approach different than the above 
mentioned ones. Basically, they depend on third parties to enhance the encryption efficiency. 
Pagano and Pagano have assumed the existence of a trusted third party that uses a re-routable 
deterministic encryption technique to link queries with performers [PAG11]. The latter technique 
is performed without allowing both the performer and the routing module any access to the 
content of the queries. On the other hand, Raykova et al. have used in [RAY11] a remote 
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synchronizer to store the decryption keys, and maintained a database memory, instead of files 
stored on hard disc, as part of the proposed architecture. 
It is worth mentioning that in enterprises’ platforms the outsourced databases are actually 
utilized in a shared mode where multiple users have access to the same records. In such a 
context, supporting security becomes challenging and special techniques are needed to guarantee 
that only authorized users get access to the protected data. Yang et al. have addressed the 
problem of multi-user settings for encrypted databases [YAN11b]. The paper uses the bilinear 
maps concept to provide a private keyword search scheme that processes encrypted queries and 
produces encrypted results from an encrypted database. This is done without disclosing the 
contents of the queries or the results. The scheme manages also users revoke and denies access 
without need to a key renewal. 
3.2.1.2 Distribution 
Distributed architectures are often adopted to eliminate complex configurations, and avoid 
additional middleware that are expensive to repair. Distribution, in general, is realized by 
distributing processes among several parties and sharing tasks with different modules. This 
concept can be adopted to build distributed database architectures with an effective security 
model. Distributed databases aim at storing data in several locations and use multiple performers 
to manage data according to their sensitivity, see Figure 3-2.  
The protection of privacy through employing the distribution concept has received a considerable 
attention in the research community. The work of Aggarwal et al. in [AGG05] and their 
extensions proposed by Ganapathy et al. in [GAN11] have presented a distributed architecture 
that partitions data between two un-trusted servers using a vertical fragmentation.  
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The system that uses encryption and some obfuscation techniques to support privacy uses a 
bottom up state algorithm to split queries into sub queries. The latter can be later addressed to 
different parties without leaving any traces. Also, the system assumes that the different servers 
are disconnected from each other, and the interrelated sensitive information is not saved in the 
same server.  
 
Figure 3-2: Distributed database architecture. 
Unlike the previously described work, Yonghong has chosen the horizontal fragmentation and 
semantic attribute decomposition to partition records over several distributed servers [YON10]. 
To preserve privacy, a probabilistic anonymity idea is employed when distributing data across 
servers. 
On the other hand, to support the privacy using a distributed architecture and encrypted data, Al 
thneibat et al. in [THN10] decompose the topology into three components 1) the databases’ 
clients that interact with the database system and submit queries, 2) the service provider that 
initiates the database structure and provides encryption keys as well as privileges to the third 
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component, and 3) SMM module, which is an interface between the client and the databases 
where most of the processing is performed. This module is responsible for managing encrypted 
database access and processing encrypted queries according to the client’s authorization. 
Indeed, all presented contributions can support the privacy for database systems in different 
ways. However, there are some theoretical approaches that have not received sufficient attention 
in this area, such as the Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS). This scheme depends on distributing a 
secret like encryption keys or sensitive data among a group of users using SSS. This secret is 
then regrouped and reconstructed by combining all of the parts shared by the participants. Within 
the same context, Bai et al. in [BAI10] have proposed a secure relational database management 
system. This system defines a parameter of access K that represents the threshold of privileges. If 
someone has an access to K or more databases in the distributed architecture, then they are 
allowed to manipulate the data. Otherwise, the access is denied.  
Finally, unlike the approaches that focus on the interaction between the client and the databases, 
Zhang and Zhao in [ZHA08] have addressed the problem of communication between databases. 
The authors have considered the queries that aim at finding both the intersection and the 
difference between several private databases using the two-party concept where each party 
protects its data and do not want to reveal the content. They have also proposed to protect 
privacy by controlling query inputs. 
3.2.1.3 Access control 
Access control is the basic technique to protect and manage data access in a database system. 
This technique assigns privileges to the specific parties that can interact with the topology and 
then checks authentication parameters to unlock the protected data for processing. The associated 
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architecture is often composed of three modules, the user, the database server and a control 
panel. The control panel verifies whether the user credentials match the control list or not, and 
then attributes or denies the access to the server, see Figure 3-3. Such database systems suffer 
from different types of attacks. The attacker can benefit from failures like privilege abuse, 
system vulnerabilities and weak audits, to gain unauthorized access to the modules and extract 
useful information.  
 
Figure 3-3: Database architecture with control panel. 
These attacks can be summarized into three main categories: 
1. Brute-force: consists of using default or weak username/passwords to gain access, along 
with the corresponding privileges, to the databases.  
2. SQL Injection: refers to submitting bad SQL queries into systems to change the behavior 
of the database and trace its responses.  
3. Privilege escalation: aims at granting good privileges to a legitimate such that he/she is 
provided with more authorities than he/she should have. 
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To face these attacks and protect the privacy, a number of contributions have been proposed. 
Burtescu paper has presented four axes to deal with these attacks [BUR08]. It advises to ignore 
the queries that require heavy processing of sensitive records. Then, it suggests hiding the exact 
value of the returned result, replacing it by an approximate one, and adding fake results in order 
to confuse the attacker in case its request requires only one answer. Yangqing et al. in [YAN09] 
have combined an audit module with a rights control mechanism based on the twice login 
technique to trace requests’ behavior and manage access to the database.  Furthermore, Ruzhi et 
al. in [RUZ10] have adopted a third party concept to provide security in the database system. 
They suggest using a Gateway mechanism that manages all entrances including the database 
admin. This new module includes four components to ensure an efficient system management. 
The first component is an authentication model that presents access rules. The second component 
is a transparent proxy module that protects database configurations. The third component is an 
attack protection module that detects and prevents different attack techniques. Finally, the fourth 
component is a connection monitoring module that controls the communication flow between the 
database and the users. Li et al. in [LI10a] have addressed control access for encrypted databases. 
They propose a mechanism to authenticate queries for encrypted databases and return encrypted 
results. Also, they advise to accompany each encrypted result with a proof that helps to 
reconstruct the result using a chained hashing technique. The authors in [BOU10, AHM11] have 
considered the special case of web databases access. Ahmad et al. in [AHM11] have considered 
the multi level access control in web databases and categorized control access into three classes: 
mandatory, discretionary and role based access controls; whereas Bouchahda et al. have 
proposed to manage control access based on the application profiles concept [BOU10]. The latter 
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defines and manages a set of SQL queries with specific permission levels varying for one session 
to another. This approach allows an adjustable control for many profiles. 
3.2.2 Secure remote execution 
Remote execution is a trend by which users, with limited hardware capabilities, can benefit from 
the powerful resources of a remote server, see Figure 3-4. This can be realized using the cloud 
computing concept, which provides users with a set of resources and services over the Internet. 
Cloud computing allows users to upload their binaries and interact with the result, as if these 
operations were executed locally. 
 
Figure 3-4: Remote execution. 
However, from the client side, these operations are actually performed on unknown and un-
trusted servers. On the other hand, from the server side, the uploaded binaries are not verified, all 
the time, and may cause real threat. Therefore, several security concerns rise in this context, like 
having users susceptible to tracking. This necessitates the need to secure the remote execution 
operation, and the importance of protecting servers from malicious and unknown users. In order 
to reach these goals, many approaches have been proposed and we organize them into three main 
categories: 
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1. Access control policies: Program restriction policies are efficient mechanisms that provide 
servers with the ability to protect themselves against programs at execution. These mechanisms 
provide some controls that define whether a program is authorized to run. This is besides a set of 
different execution rules that manage the access process. These rules are useful in identifying the 
software using some information exported with it such as, the hash information, the certificate 
authority and the program’s zone. The hash information is a cryptographic signature that 
identifies the software using its associated hash value, the file length and the hash ID. The 
certificate authority identifies the software publisher, and therefore, helps in making the software 
trustworthy. The certificate defines a code signing information that points to the owner of that 
certificate. Finally, the programs’ zone refers to the location from where it was uploaded. A 
number of research studies have focused on enhancing software execution policies such as 
[PAN00], [KIR02], [SON10], [ABB10], [KIM11] and [ALV10]. In [PAN00], Pandey et al. have 
provided a general access control policy by defining a declarative access constraint language to 
restrict access to system components. In [KIR02], Kiriansky et al. have proposed a number of 
requirements that support security at program execution. At first, access program is restricted 
depending on its origin. Then, limits are imposed to control access based on the source and the 
destination as well as the transfer type. Finally, a program is forced to pass through different 
checkpoints that ensure its trustworthiness. In [SON10], Song et al. have used a logging 
mechanism that provides access only to allowed components. They have also proposed an 
architecture that utilizes a key repository, a mandatory access control, and encryption to form an 
efficient access control method. Abbasi et al. in [ABB10] have focused mainly on web 
applications, and therefore, have proposed the use of secure web proxies and an extensible access 
control markup language based on authorization policies. This work has also proposed to secure 
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the communication between the web server and the protected web pages by means of the 
asynchronous communication protocol. Kim and Kim have introduced a different approach that 
makes use of virtualization concepts to divide the execution environment into two disconnected 
domains with different security policies [KIM11]. One domain is dedicated for service requests. 
It transforms consumer requests into an understandable message, using a multiplexer. Then, the 
message is submitted to the second domain, which acts as a service provider. Finally, Alves et al. 
in [ALV10] have improved a runtime platform by modifying the TLS connection to implement a 
transport component for secure session execution. 
2. Obfuscation: The obfuscation technique helps in protecting programs against tracking and 
monitoring as they run remotely. This method is used to transform the source code into another 
equivalent, but irreversible, form that is difficult to understand. Obfuscation focuses on the 
protection of the data structure and the control flow of the code. While, the first consists of 
hiding the source code formatting and the attributes’ name, the second consists of obfuscating 
the control flow of the program that includes program statements, jumps, returns…etc. These 
controls are modified by either replacing call methods by their body or fake instructions and 
useless code that sets blind the program behavior. A set of contributions, namely [TOY05], 
[POP07], [CHE09], [SCH11], [WAN11], [ARM11], and [WEI11], where the authors have 
addressed programs’ obfuscation and have proposed different models to make it hard to reverse 
engineer these programs. Toyofuku et al. in [TOY05] have proposed the use of random values to 
hide the control flow of a program. In the proposed technique, an index is assigned to each 
method and then, during the execution, a random value is generated to decide which method to 
invoke. This technique makes it hard to follow the execution and protects the program from 
static analysis. The work in [POP07] makes understanding the program hard by firstly inserting 
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additional statements, and then replacing jumps, method calls and returns by a set of fake 
instructions that lead to the obfuscated operation. The contribution of [SCH11] is different than 
the previous ones as it has focused on dynamic analysis. The authors have proposed a 
mechanism based on diversification concept to disallow running the programs several times and 
logging their traces. In [WAN11], the authors have proposed the use of fake variables and simple 
loops that add a huge number of possible execution paths. Armoogum and Caully in [ARM11] 
have suggested three obfuscation techniques: A variable renaming procedure, a comment 
removal mechanism, and a control statement insertion that consists of adding useless statements 
(like if statement, loops, dead code…etc) to confuse the disassembling. In [WEI11], Wei has 
provided an additional obfuscation technique that consists of transforming functions into a table 
function that only shows the input and the output data. Finally, Chen et al. in [CHE09] have 
proposed a binary obfuscation technique based on the taint tags and the opaque predicates. 
3. Cryptography: Encryption has often been used to protect sensitive data in several areas 
against malicious and unauthorized users. It consists of employing and managing a set of 
encryption/decryption keys that lock/unlock a specific piece of data. The same concept has also 
been used to encrypt some software modules in order to obfuscate their behavior and secure the 
whole architecture. The contributions [PAT07], [SON10], [ABB10], [BIS07], [WEI11], and 
[BRE11] are key examples of such architectures. In [PAT07], Patel et al. have proposed an 
architecture where the program information are encrypted using a secure key and stored in a 
dedicated processor. Whereas the authors of [SON10], [ABB10] and [BIS07] have chosen 
encryption techniques that aim at protecting web page contents, data and software by storing 
decryption keys and allowing only authorized users to access their content. In the same direction, 
the work presented in [WEI11] has advocated the use of RSA encryption and the impossibility of 
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factorization of prime numbers to control the computational complexity. On the other hand, 
Brenner et al. have discussed in [BRE11] a different concept and have focused on computations 
over encrypted data using HES. This work has proposed a scheme that designs encrypted circuits 
using an integer representation, and allows a performer to operate over them without being aware 
of their content.  
3.2.3 Location Based Services and Mobility Solutions 
In the recent decades we have noticed that both the growth of the smart phone industry and the 
rise of connectivity have resulted in the emergence of a diverse set of products and services. 
These products and services have paved the way for the development of new promising business 
models. Among these technologies, Location-Based Services (LBSs), see Figure 3-5, have 
attracted the utmost attention in the research community. In general, we shall mention that these 
services rely on the development of wireless networks, the innovation of positioning services, and 
the availability of information. These three elements are mainly used to determine the current 
position of a user, and therefore, locate the closest businesses or services (banks, restaurants, 
universities…etc) around that user. The user can enquire about that information by 
communicating wirelessly with an LBS server.  
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Figure 3-5: Basic LBS architecture. 
However, since this technology deals with sensitive information (like the current position of the 
user and his/her daily habits), providing a secure architecture that allows the abovementioned 
elements to interact anonymously between each other becomes an essential task. Therefore, 
several approaches have been devised to resolve this problem. These approaches provide various 
secure models for the LBS technology, and aim at protecting the privacy of the enquirer and the 
location whereabouts. The contributions that aim at protecting the enquirer’s information and 
hiding their real identity tend to prevent LBS servers from collecting information to identify the 
users. The approaches that we are referring to employ anonymity techniques such as [XU07], 
[XU08], [GRU03], [GED05], and [MOK06] or pseudonym like [JOR07] and [ZEI08]. They all 
aim at obfuscating the real use and mislead the service providers. The anonymity techniques work 
on protecting user identity from its neighbors precisely. This means that when a client enquires 
about a specific location, the anonymizer module replaces the query by a box that combines the 
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user location with those of its neighbors, and sends it instead of the query that was originally 
requested. The anonymizer then distributes the generated response to the appropriate user while 
making use of the real identity. Within the same principle, pseudonym is another technique by 
which users protect their identities. This technique uses fake identifiers instead of the real ones 
and delegates the mapping between them to a location intermediary. Jorns et al. in [JOR07] have 
designed a system architecture for using safety LBS while relying on pseudonym transaction. The 
latter consists of generating unique pseudonyms for each transaction such that no fake identifier 
can be reused again within subsequent operations. Using a different approach, the work presented 
in [ZEI08] relies on random numbers and strings to generate strong pseudonyms that are used as a 
basis for an LBS authentication mechanism. 
Within the same context of enforcing the privacy and security of the user’s location, several 
techniques have been developed. The main concepts that have been utilized in these techniques 
are relying on K neighbors, sending a cloaking region instead of the true location, and initiating 
several fake requests. The first technique, which is K-anonymity, depends on hiding the location 
information among the K-1 surrounding locations. Then, instead of working with the real 
location, the combination of all neighbors’ locations is employed (see [REI79], [GED04], 
[GED05], and [MOK06]). This concept has been extended to provide another technique called the 
cloaked region. This technique was first proposed by [KAL06]. It depends on using the dimension 
of a particular region, the size of which depends on the specified security level, and protecting the 
location privacy by sending requests to the whole region instead of one location. On the other 
hand, Kido et al. [KID05] and You et al. [YOU07] have proposed a different method to reach the 
same goal. Their technique relies on a third party component that adds to the original request 
many fake queries, with different fake identities, to prevent LBS from revealing the true 
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information. Furthermore, Argadna et al. [ARD11] have proposed an obfuscation technique that 
transforms the location measurements by changing both the radius and the center, and then sends 
the obfuscated location to LBS. Wightman et al. in [WIG11] have focused on three pre-existing 
techniques: the randomization, K-anonymity and clocking region, and then proposed new 
extensions. Basically, the authors have introduced three techniques: N-Rand, N-Mix and N-
Dispersion. While the randomization technique consists of changing the center of an area by 
another random point to allow users obfuscate their real location, the N-Rand enhances this 
concept by introducing another parameter that defines the suitable distance of obfuscation. The N-
Mix technique relies on randomly generated locations instead of adopting the basic concept of K-
anonymous, which relies on pre existing users’ location. Finally, the N-Dispersion technique 
enhances the concept of dispersion, which consists of de-centering the circular area, by 
performing n trials while still looking for the new displacement. A different but simple technique 
has been introduced by He et al. in [He11]. It works on cheating on the sent location by modifying 
the GPS API and sending fake locations instead. The authors in [JI11] have relied on K-
anonymity to define different cells in order to hide the path a user follows from source to 
destination, whereas the contribution of Pingley et al. has developed query perturbation-based 
scheme that relies on generating several fake queries that take into account the query context 
[PIN11]. Finally, Chen and J. Pang have proposed in [CHE12] a different scheme that relies on 
some metrics to design the most secure region for a specific user profile. 
3.2.4 Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks 
Ad-hoc wireless networking is the revolutionary approach that allows all the devices that belong 
to the same communication range, and support the necessary wireless equipment, to directly 
exchange information in a peer-to-peer mode, see Figure 3-6.  
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Figure 3-6: Ad-hoc wireless environment. 
These devices, called nodes, join and leave the network dynamically and collaborate in a 
benevolent manner by forwarding packets to other neighboring nodes. However, many 
challenges arise against the efficiency of the ad hoc network’s architecture because of the nodes’ 
availability problem, and the fact that this technology does not rely on pre-existing topologies. 
The latter factor has received a special attention in the literature, especially that is has a direct 
impact on routing protocols. In general, the routing concept relies on the voluntary cooperation 
of various nodes that are able to forward packets from a given source to a specific destination. 
Given the importance of routing in the network, guaranteeing a secured topology is essential to 
preserve the privacy. This is because malicious and selfish nodes, if available, may mislead 
nodes’ collaboration and make packet delivery probabilistic. In order to avoid this problem and 
ensure a secure exchange of information, several mechanisms have been proposed. The most 
common mechanism in this context is the trust-based methodology. This mechanism enforces the 
fact that each node evaluates its neighbors and assigns them trust values that are continuously 
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updated based on their degree of cooperation. Hence, trust values are used to define a trust route. 
Within the same context, Gera et al. in [GER10] have based their work on an effective 
combination of both a trust value approach and a multipath route technique. From one side, the 
trust value approach depends on collaborations with only faithful nodes. On the other side, the 
multipath route technique chooses several paths to reach the destination and forwards the packet 
over them in order to increase the delivery rate. Parvin et al. in [PAR10] have proposed the use 
of a given threshold to decide whether to collaborate with a specific node or not. Basically, the 
proposal uses different parameters, like the requesting information, the type of data, and the 
exchange history, to calculate a value that is associated with each node. If a node’s associated 
value is greater than the set threshold, then it is allowed to be part of the routing process. El-
Bendary et al. in [BEN11] has focused on the direct diffusion routing algorithm that mainly 
relies on sending low frequency requests and acts according to the feedback (positive or 
negative). This algorithm has enabled the authors to design an authenticated acknowledgment-
based protocol. This protocol inherits many features from this technique, like the propagation 
phase and the authentication stage that validates the ACK message, this latter is used to confirm 
the delivery. On the other hand B-Tebibel in [BOU11] has proposed to protect the routing 
protocol using a hashed, one-time passwords protocol that consists of checking each hop while 
constructing the path. Within the same context and using a different approach, the technique that 
has been presented in [LI11] depends on an identity-based routing protocol that uses digital 
signatures to ensure that the collaborating nodes are credible. This protocol also checks the 
remaining energy in each of these nodes to confirm their readiness to participate in the route. 
Similarly, the contributions in [MAH11] and [ZHA12] have used the energy levels as well as the 
past behavior of the nodes to decide which path is more secure. The authors in [FAG11] have 
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used a different approach that relies on the information from the application layer to design a 
cross-layer approach, which monitors the network and put away the packets from the danger 
zone, and a routing protocol. This approach consists of broadcasting a route discovery action by 
sending a probe message, and then locates the area where malicious nodes exist in order to 
successfully route the packets away from them. Finally, Abumansoor and Boukerche in 
[ABU11] have proposed to use the node’s location information, mobility, and stability to decide 
whether it can be trusted as part of the route or not. 
3.2.5 Video On-Demand Services 
In the recent decades, the growth of Internet infrastructure and the improvement of various 
streaming protocols have resulted in the emergence of a wide portfolio of interesting services. 
Among these services, Video On-Demand (VOD) has attracted the utmost attention. VOD 
enables users to retrieve and have full access of a large set of videos at their convenience, and 
this has contributed to the widespread popularity of VOD, see Figure 3-7. 
 
Figure 3-7: Basic VOD architecture. 
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However, this useful service faces major security challenges, especially related to the 
confidentiality of service providers and the privacy of end users. Service providers seek to 
protect their own video store by granting access only for authorized clients. On the other side, 
clients require that service providers do not monitor or track the different services they purchase. 
In order to achieve these levels of protection, several secure protocols have been proposed and 
studied. Most of the suggested protocols have adopted encryption techniques that obfuscate 
videos content and enforce a secure transfer. 
Lee et al. have used the digital watermarking technique to protect video content and trace illegal 
distribution [LEE10]. This technique primarily encrypts the video, by applying different XOR 
operations, and then transmits it to the appropriate destination which is encrypted using a 
suitable key as well. From the client’s perspective, the video is watermarked using the 
appropriate user ID in order to deny any illegal distribution. The work presented in [ROY11] has 
proposed a different approach that makes use of both compression and joint encryption to protect 
the video content. This means that the encryption scheme enforces the use of two different 
encryption keys instead of one. The first key, named the temporal key, is used to encrypt every 
single frame in the video. The first temporal key, associated to the first frame, is generated from 
the video key created by the video provider. Every other temporal key is hashed from its 
previous one associated to the previous frame. Because every frame is divided into several slices, 
the scheme makes use of a second key, called the spatial key, to encrypt each slice. This 
powerful technique aims at protecting the system from any frame loss incidents. The authors in 
[LI10b] have combined a hierarchical encryption strategy with XOR operations to provide a 
secure encryption scheme for the video content, and allow only authorized nodes to decrypt the 
data. The work in [VAR11] has relied on Galois field polynomials to provide a robust encryption 
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algorithm. This algorithm encrypts the intra frame by using secret sharing techniques and 
provides safe entities with the requested access. To achieve the same goal of encrypting the 
video content, Yeung et al. have used in [YEU11] the 8x8 block technique, while the authors in 
[DUB11], [JAN11], and [SWA12] have chosen partially encryption techniques to increase the 
performance of their systems. On one hand, Dubois et al. have relied on a selective encryption 
technique that partially encrypts the content of the video [DUB11]. Their approach firstly 
analyzes each macro block separately, using some metrics and measures, and then decides 
whether it will be encrypted or not without interfering with the level of security. On the other 
hand, the work in [JAN11] has relied on the expected quality, the available information about the 
content, and the multimedia scene to make excessive use of the Huffman code compression and 
partially encrypt the video content. Similarly, Swaminathan, and Mitra have partially encrypted 
in [SWA12] the video contents based on the entropy and the sensibility of the samples. Due to 
the importance of the privacy issue, Varalakshmi et al. have come up in [VAR12] with a 
different approach that combines both the permutation code algorithm and dynamic keys in order 
to successfully protect confidential video transmission. In this approach, the permutation table is 
calculated by means of DCT coefficient and video motion measures.  
It is undeniable that the security of Internet applications, services, and routing protocols can be 
achieved by employing different techniques. However, the most common approach followed by 
researchers is to adopt a third party concept, which is considered a major hole in the architecture 
because it may be a single point of attack. As a result, a system that ensures a direct secure 
communications between all parties can be more successful, and therefore, we advocate the use 
of HES as they are well aligned with our objectives. 
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3.3 Homomorphic Encryption Schemes 
Homomorphic encryption allows performers to compute correct operations over encrypted 
values without being aware of their content. This possibility is due to the fact that the encryption 
circuit is defined as a group homomorphism, which preserves operations in the group. Group 
homomorphism makes the computing over encrypted or plain values of the same effect. This 
flexibility resolves security issues in a variety of applications that delegate sensitive processing 
to un-trusted third parties.  
In this section, we overview the history of homomorphic encryption and describe its mechanisms 
and characteristics. We also highlight different applications where the involvement of HES is 
beneficial. 
3.3.1 History 
The existence of an efficient homomorphic encryption has been standing an open question for a 
long time. The first model has been proposed in 1978 by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos 
[RIV78]. They have used the exponentiation and large integers to design an additive and 
multiplicative homomorphic circuit called the RSA. RSA uses the fact that it is difficult to factor 
large prime numbers to define a strong public key cryptosystem. This key is used to encrypt data 
and perform simple operations over them. Many other works (like [GOL82], [ELG84], [PAI99], 
[DAM01], and [GAL02]) have followed the same concept in order to provide more efficient 
homomorphic schemes. The GM scheme [GOL82] proposed by Goldwasser and Micali is a 
probabilistic asymmetric public key encryption system that produces a ciphertext of size bigger 
than its associated input plaintext and then performs additions modulo 2 over that ciphertext. 
ElGamal in [ELG84] has used the Diffie-Hellman key exchange concept to define another 
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probabilistic asymmetric key encryption algorithm based on exponentiations. Following these 
attempts, Paillier has proposed in [PAI99] the first secure and efficient additive scheme; it relies 
on operations in the ring of integers modulo 𝑃2  where P is the product of two large primes. 
Thereafter, this interesting scheme has been the subject of other extensions (see [GAL02] and 
[DAM01]) that aimed at generalizing its basic concept. These extensions have used either the 
context of elliptic curves or computing in the rings of integers modulo 𝑃𝑠+1, where Paillier’s 
scheme is the case with s = 1. Despite the obvious progress achieved in performing computations 
over encrypted values, the cited schemes are considered only semi-homomorphic since they 
support either additions or multiplications, but not both operations at the same time. Therefore, 
providing a scheme that supports both additions and multiplications has remained an open 
challenge until 2005, when Boneh et al. published their scheme in [BON05]. Although the latter 
could only support a single multiplication and many additions, it has paved the way for other 
attempts to provide robust schemes, such as the FHE that has been introduced by Gentry 
[GEN09a]. 
3.3.2 The Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme 
The first FHE scheme that has been proposed by Gentry [GEN09a] was a form of encryption that 
supports performing arbitrary additions and multiplications, at the same time, on encrypted 
values. It uses the polynomial form 𝑐 =  𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑞 + 2 ∗ 𝑟 + 𝑚 to define a probabilistic public key 
cryptosystem, where 𝑚 is the bit value to encrypt as c, 𝑟 and 𝑞 are two random integers, and pk 
is the public key with the requirement that 2*r is smaller than 𝑝𝑘 /2. Then, the decryption is 
correctly retrieved by carrying out two modulo operations such that  𝑚 =  𝑐 mod 𝑠𝑘 mod 2 , 
where 𝑠𝑘 is the correspondent secret key. In more details, the proposed scheme consists of four 
main modules:  
 40 
1) KeyGen (λ): This module outputs two random values 𝑝𝑘 and 𝑠𝑘, which are the public and 
secret keys, respectively. These outputs are based on the parameter of security λ  that 
specifies the length of encryption keys and the encrypted value.  
2) Encrypt (𝑝𝑘, 𝑚): This module encrypts (transforms) a bit value {0, 1} into a big integer at 
the order of λn-bit number that has the same parity as the original bit value, where n ∈ ℕ . 
3) Decrypt (𝑠𝑘, 𝑐): This module decrypts the input ciphertext 𝑐 based on the appropriate secret 
key 𝑠𝑘 .  
4) Evaluate (𝑝𝑘,𝐶, *): This module presents the ciphertext result of the performed circuit 𝐶 
over the encrypted values.  
The goal of this scheme, which is called a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme 
(SHES), is to provide conditioned number of operations over protected data. This condition 
relies mainly on the fact that the ciphertext c mod pk (called the noise of the scheme) should be 
smaller than pk/2. However, this noise value, which doubles after each addition and squares 
after each multiplication, exceeds the threshold pk/2 after a finite number of operations, and the 
correct decryption will not be guaranteed anymore. Therefore, Gentry has proposed a 
bootstrapping procedure to remove the noise and provide augmented number of algebraic 
computations.  
3.3.3 Bootstrapping and the Fully Homomorphic Scheme 
The key idea behind bootstrapping is to re-encrypt a bounded ciphertext to refresh its noise value 
and then support more computations. The bootstrapping encrypts a fired ciphertext c into a new 
ciphertext 𝑐+, which is a double encryption of the plaintext, with a fresh noise. Furthermore, all 
homomorphic properties are applied on that new ciphertext, which is an encrypted form of the 
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old one. Thereafter, after many computations and before the encrypted result exceeds the 
threshold, one can perfectly decrypt that result to retrieve another ciphertext that has the same 
parity as the plaintext.  
The bootstrapping technique uses a public key to re-encrypt every bit in the cipher text and 
produce a new clean cipher text with smaller noise. Then, it uses an encrypted private key to 
remove the inner layer of the encryption and extract the original cipher text. It is apparent that 
the original plaintext is simply a double decryption of the bootstrapped values. 
By adopting a bootstrapping technique, The SHES produces a FHES that supports unlimited 
number of both additions and multiplications. It is worth mentioning, however, that 
bootstrapping is a time consuming task since re-encryption is usually performed over big integer 
values.  
3.4 Conclusion 
In this Chapter we have highlighted a number of techniques that aim at securing applications, 
services, and routing protocols. However, we have seen that most of these techniques still suffer 
from the leak of security and need to be enhanced. Therefore, we have discussed the importance 
of HES and how they can protect the privacy of users. In the next chapters, we use HES to 
propose novel models with efficient architectures for sensitive applications. 
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Chapter 4  
 
 
Secure Database System using 
Homomorphic Encryption Schemes 
4.1 Introduction 
Cloud computing is an attractive solution that can provide low cost storage and processing 
capabilities for government agencies, hospitals, and small and medium enterprises. It has the 
advantage of reducing the IT costs and providing more services for the requesting parties through 
making specialized software and computing resources available. However, there are major 
concerns that should be considered by any organization migrating to cloud computing. The 
confidentiality of information as well as the liability for incidents affecting the infrastructure 
arise as two important examples in this context. Indeed, cloud computing poses several data 
protection risks for the cloud’s clients and providers. For example, the cloud’s client may not be 
aware of the practices according to which the cloud’s provider processes the stored data. 
Therefore, the cloud’s client cannot guarantee that the data are processed (for example, altered or 
deleted) in a legal and accepted manner.  
All of the above mentioned issues can be resolved if the data in the cloud are stored and 
processed in encrypted and blind form. The latter is possible if the encryption scheme can 
support addition and multiplication of the encrypted data. A cryptosystem which supports both 
addition and multiplication (referred to as FHES) can be effective data protection, and enables 
the construction of programs that receive encrypted input and produce encrypted output. Since 
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such programs do not decrypt the input, they can be run by an un-trusted party without revealing 
their data and internal states. Such programs will have great practical implications in the 
outsourcing of private computations, especially in the context of cloud computing and remote 
databases. In theory, the data in such secure systems could be encrypted by the client, and then 
sent to the cloud’s provider for storage or processing. Only the client holds the decryption keys 
necessary to read the data. Indeed, this model of computing can preserve the confidentiality and 
integrity of the data while delegating the storage and processing to an un-trusted third party.  
In this chapter, we present a novel technique to execute SQL statements over encrypted data. We 
develop a secure database system that processes these queries. The parameters of SQL queries 
are encrypted by the requester and sent to the server for processing. The latter performs the 
requested operation over an encrypted database and returns an encrypted result to the client. The 
advantage of this system is that the database server knows neither the content nor the position of 
the records affected by the query. 
Despite the fact that this type of processing may increase the amount of computing time, the 
benefits associated with it are worth the processing overhead.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we review the literature for 
the work related to private information retrieval (PIR) approaches. Section 4.3 provides a formal 
description of our secured SQL statements approach. Section 4.4 presents a homomorphic 
cryptosystem that we use to build a prototype system. Section 4.5 presents an implementation of 
a secure relational database system. In Section 4.6 we provide performance analysis of the 
proposed secure database system. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes our work and provides future 
research directions. 
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4.2 Private information retrieval 
Chow et al. [CHO09] discussed the importance of cloud computing, and how this technology can 
be enticing due to its flexibility and cost-efficiency. The authors pointed out that the adoption of 
such technology is still below ambition. Some users are still concerned about the security of 
these clouds. Even those who started using the technology, they only utilize it with their less 
sensitive data. The limited usage of cloud computing is mainly due to the lack of control over the 
communicated data. The authors highlight that people require explicit guarantees that their data 
will be protected under well-defined policies and mechanisms. However, no technical security 
solutions were proposed to back-up their information centric model where data can self defend 
itself in a hostile or an un-trusted environment. 
The PIR approach, introduced by Chor et al. in [CHO98], achieves the retrieval of an 𝑖𝑡ℎ  bit in a 
block without revealing information about the bit retrieved or about the request for the bit itself. 
This approach has been widely used as a basis for several tools, and has supported various 
distributed applications. However, the approach requires more improvements and the work with 
it is still in progress, both at the security of the communication channel level and the hidden 
client identity level. 
Raykova et al. [RAY09] extended the PIR approach by proposing a secure anonymous search 
system. The system employs keyword search such that only authorized clients have access to 
their blocks. This system is capable of mapping the database content to the appropriate client, 
thus guaranteeing the privacy of the data and the query. The ultimate target of Raykova’s system 
is to ignore the identity of the client while protecting the database from malicious enquirers. 
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Shang et al. [SHA10] tackled the problem of protecting the database itself. The problem is 
studied through monitoring the amount of data disclosed by a PIR protocol during a single run. 
The information attained from the monitoring process is used to understand how a malicious 
enquirer can conduct attacks to retrieve excessive amount of data from the server.  
PIR has also been used to develop authentication systems. Nakamura et al. [NAK09] constructed 
a system with three components, a enquirer that initiates requests, an authentication-server that 
processes these requests, and a database that returns the appropriate data in response to the 
request. This system ensures the security of data and the anonymous communication between the 
enquirer and the database. Yinan and Cao [YIN09] used the PIR approach to propose a system 
that controls the access to the database. According to this system, the privacy of data is enforced 
by enabling each authorizer to give or deny access to his/her own data with a hierarchical 
authorization access right scheme.  
Among the most important criteria in PIR protocol are the communication cost and the amount 
of data sent back to the enquirer. The trivial solution of the PIR protocol is to send back the 
entire database to the client. However, this solution is expensive, even for a simple request that 
results in retrieving two matching records. Other approaches proposed to retrieve only the 
requested data, by using replicated databases that are stored at multiple servers. In this case, the 
request is forwarded to all servers. With this approach, although we deal with multiple replicated 
databases, the privacy is better protected. However, this approach is still complicated and may 
result in extended processing and communication times. Gentry et al. [GEN05] proposed a 
scheme to retrieve a bit or a block from a database with a constant communication rate. Melchor 
et al. [MEL08] proposed a scheme that reaches the available data with a reasonable 
communication cost while achieving lower computational cost compared to other PIR protocols. 
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4.3 Secured SQL operations 
In this section, we develop a secure database system that processes SQL queries over encrypted 
data. As shown in Figure 4-1, parameters of the queries are encrypted by the client and sent to 
the server for processing. The latter performs the requested operation and returns encrypted 
results to the client. We describe below the circuit of a simple SQL SELECT query:  
SELECT * from T where c=v 
where the value v is in encrypted form. The trivial solution to securely perform this statement is 
to send back to the client the entire database, but this solution suffers from complexity and 
scalability issues. Instead, we propose a methodology to implement the SELECT circuit at the 
server side, while preserving the confidentiality and the privacy of the request. 
The processing of the SELECT query is divided into three sub-circuits. Firstly, we calculate the 
following index for each record R in the table T: 
∀𝑅 ∈ 𝑇 𝐼𝑅 =  (1 ⊕ 𝑐𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒−1
𝑖=0
⊕𝑣𝑖) 
where size is the number of bits in column c; 𝑐𝑖  and 𝑣𝑖  are the i
th 
bits of column c and search 
criteria v, respectively. 𝐼𝑅  is a one bit value that is equal to 1 if v matches the value of column c, 
0 otherwise. ⊕ is a XOR operation.  
 
Figure 4-1: Secure Data Retrieval. 
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Next, we identify the n
th
 record that matches the selection criteria. For that purpose, we consider 
𝜂 = 𝜀𝑝𝑘 (𝑛) to be the encryption of n under public key pk. 
For each record R we calculate the following sum: 
∀𝑅 ∈ 𝑇: 𝑆𝑅 =  𝐼𝑅
𝑖≤𝑅
 
We calculate a second index 𝐼′𝑅: 
∀𝑅 ∈ 𝑇 𝐼′𝑅 = 𝐼𝑅 ×  (1 ⊕𝜂𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒−1
𝑖=0
⊕𝑆𝑅,𝑖) 
𝐼′𝑅  is equal to 1 if the record R is the n
th
 record that matches the selection criteria, 0 otherwise. 
Then, we multiply every bit of each record R in table T by the corresponding value 𝐼′𝑅  to 
construct a new record 𝑅′. 
∀𝑅 ∈ 𝑇:𝑅′ = 𝐼′𝑅 × 𝑅   
This latter operation forms a new table 𝑇′ that is related to the original table T with the following 
characteristics: 
 𝑅
′ = 𝑅 𝑖𝑓 𝑅 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑡ℎ  record matching the criteria
𝑅′ = 0  otherewise
  
Finally, by adding all records of table 𝑇′, we retrieve the nth record Rs that matches the selection 
criteria: 
𝑅𝑠 =  𝑅′
𝑅′∈𝑇′
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If no record matches the selection criteria, a record containing zeros will be returned to the 
requester. 
It is worth noting that all calculations are performed over encrypted data. The server does a blind 
processing to retrieve the n
th
 record that matches the selection criteria. It neither has access to the 
content of the retrieved record nor to its position within the table. 
With slight modifications to the select circuit, most of SQL operations can be supported by our 
proposed secure database system. For example, to implement the UPDATE operation, one can 
simply implement the following circuit: 
∀𝑅 ∈ 𝑇:  𝑅′ = 𝐼𝑅 ∗ 𝑅 + 𝐼𝑅 ∗ 𝑈 
where the record U is the new value to update the record R matching the criteria of the query. 
Similarly, to delete a record from table 𝑇, one can replace its content by zero. The DELETE 
operation can be implemented by the following circuit: 
∀𝑅 ∈ 𝑇:  𝑅′ = 𝐼𝑅 ∗ 𝑅 
4.4 Homomorphic encryption scheme 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Gentry proposed a FHES that enables to perform an 
arbitrary number of arithmetic operations (i.e. addition and multiplication) on encrypted data. 
The components of a boostrappable encryption scheme, already described in sections 3.3.2 and 
3.3.3,  are detailed below. 
In what follows we consider the security parameters: N = λ, P =  λ2, and Q =  λ5.  
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4.4.1 Key generation 
The private key sk is a random λ2-bit odd number p. The public key consists of a list of integers 
that are the “encryptions of zero” using the encryption scheme with the secret key sk as a public 
key. 
Generate a set y  = {y1,… , yβ} of rational numbers in [0,2[ such that there is a sparse subset 
S ∈ {1,… ,β} of size ∝ with  yi ≈
1
p mod 2i∈S , and with the condition: 0 <∝< 𝛽.  
Set sk* to be the sparse subset S, encoded as a vector s ∈ {0,1}β  with hamming weight ∝. 
Set pk∗ ← (𝑝𝑘, y  )     to be the public key. 
4.4.2 Encryption (pk*,m) 
Set m′  to be a random λ-bit number such that m and m’ have the same parity:  
m′ = m%2 
Then compute c as: 
c ← m′ + pq 
where q is a random λ5-bit number. Then the ciphertext c is post-processed to produce a vector 
z = {z1,… , zβ}, defined by: 
zi ← c. yimod 2 
The output ciphertext c* consists of c and z = {z1,… , zβ}. 
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4.4.3 Decryption (sk*, c*) 
m ← LSB(c) ⊕ LSB( si . zi
i
) 
where LBS means the least significant bit.  
4.4.4 Arithmetic operations 
Addition and multiplication can be performed on clear text by simply adding and multiplying the 
ciphertexts, respectively. 
εpk  m1 ∗ m2 = εpk  m1 ∗ εpk (m2) 
εpk  m1 + m2 = εpk  m1 + εpk (m2) 
The output ciphertext c* consists of c together with the result of post-processing the resulting 
ciphertext with y  . 
4.4.5 Bootstrapping the Encryption Scheme 
The encryption scheme described above is referred to as a SHE because it works only if value of 
the ratio c%p (noise of the encryption) is smaller than p/2. After a finite number of arithmetic 
operations, the noise exceeds the p/2 threshold and the decryption does not work anymore. 
 
Figure 4-2: Removing noise from original ciphertext (bootstrapping). 
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Gentry developed a novel method to remove the noise in the ciphertext [GEN09a]. He proposed 
to recrypt the ciphertext c to remove the noise. Since the scheme is homomorphic, one can 
encrypt the ciphertext c into a new ciphertext c+ (the plaintext is encrypted twice), and by using 
the homomorphic properties of the scheme, one can decrypt the inner layer of encryption to 
obtain a ciphertext c2 with a lower value of noise. 
As illustrated in Figure 4-2, a bit m is encrypted with public key pk to produce the ciphertext c1. 
After a finite number of arithmetic operations, the noise associated with the ciphertext c1 reaches 
a level that does not permit any additional arithmetic operation. To remove the noise, the 
bootstrapping technique consists of recrypting the bit m. Every bit of ciphertext c1 is encrypted 
with the public key pk. The output is ciphertext 𝑐 that doubly encrypts bit m. The decryption 
circuit is applied to remove the inner layer of encryption. This latter operation requires the 
knowledge of the private sk. Therefore, the private key is encrypted with public key pk; and then 
shared with the server. Since the encryption scheme is homomorphic, the decryption can be 
performed on the doubly encrypted ciphertext to remove the inner layer. The recryption produces 
a new ciphertext c2 with a value of noise that has an upper bound according to the proof in 
[GEN10a]. 
Indeed, the bootstrapping is a time consuming task. To technically show that, we measured the 
time required to perform the product of two n-bits numbers in encrypted form using the fully 
homomorphic cryptosystem (with bootstrapping).  
Figure 4-3 shows the amount of time, in seconds, required to compute this homomorphic 
multiplication circuit . 
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Figure 4-3: Processing time required to perform the product of two n-bits integers. 
As we can see in Figure 4-3, the circuit takes 23 minutes to compute the product of two 16-bit 
integers. This latency is mainly due to the recrypt function.  
Despite the amount of time needed and required while employing the bootstrapping technique, 
performing fully secure systems in a blind fashion becomes possible and all these performance 
issues could be fixed. 
4.5 Implementation  
In our implementation, we aim at proving that it is possible to perform SQL queries over an 
encrypted database. For example, the user can specify a search criterion through a database. 
Then, the client software encrypts the parameters of the query, corresponding to the search 
criterion, and sends it to the appropriate server. The server retrieves the requested record (blind 
processing) from the database and returns it to the client. The client software decrypts the record 
and displays it to the user.  
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We built a simple medical application containing 10 patients’ records. In Figure 4-4, we show 
the result of the SELECT query. This is how the result appears in a screenshot of the client side 
of our built application. The application supports the following SQL operations: 
 SELECT with wildcard characters (*, ?) and relational operators (< >). 
 UPDATE with wildcard characters (*, ?) and relational operators (< >). 
 DELETE with wildcard characters (*, ?) and relational operators (< >). 
 Statistical operations like COUNT and AVG. 
It is worth mentioning that the implementation of the medical application was built using a 
somewhat homomorphic scheme. This is due to performance issues as it is impractical to 
perform our tests using the fully homomorphic cryptosystem. We chose the security parameter in 
such a way to support all the SQL operations with no need to employ the bootstrapping λ=3 
technique. We discuss the performance of our system in the next section. 
 
Figure 4-4: Client side of the application. 
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4.6 Performance analysis 
Table 4.1 lists the number of arithmetic operations required to execute some basic SQL 
statements over an encrypted database of 10 records. From this table we can see that processing 
data in encrypted form creates a substantial computation overhead. 
 Add. & Mult. Add. Mult. 
SELECT 619839 309892 309947 
UPDATE 67595 25355 42240 
DELETE 28171 5643 22528 
Table 4.1: Number of arithmetic operations 
Taking into account that with such configuration, we need 2 seconds and 1 second to perform 
10
4
 Mult and 10
5
 Add, respectively. That means, the select circuit takes more than one minute to 
perform a search request in that database .     
Towards that end, we used a computer machine with 1.7 GHz processor and 3GB of RAM 
memory. Microsoft Visual studio 2008 C++ has been used to develop the application.   
The implementation of the system proves that the execution of SQL statements over encrypted 
data is feasible. However, the time required to execute these statements is very high and 
therefore is not suitable for real-time transactions that involve a large database (i.e. several 
terabytes database). This drawback is mainly due to the FHES. In fact, there might be more 
efficient techniques to optimize the implementation, that is, one could perform recryption only 
when it is necessary, since the noise value can be bounded; however, we do believe that a more 
practical homomorphic cryptosystem is yet to be developed. 
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4.7 Conclusions and future directions 
The concept of processing encrypted data is promising to revolutionize traditional computing. 
Indeed, this concept has many direct applications in cloud computing environments, banking, 
electronic voting and many other applications.  
In this chapter we developed the first secure database system based on a FHES. We presented the 
circuits to implement SQL statements over encrypted data. We built a prototype of a database 
system where data is stored and processed in encrypted form. The database server can execute 
most of the SQL statements in a blind fashion, that is, it returns the results without any 
knowledge of the content or the position of the records extracted/affected. We conducted 
performance analysis to measure the time needed to execute a simple query on the database. We 
found that the current technology is not sufficiently mature yet as it is time-consuming. Indeed, 
the encryption schemes proposed by Gentry et al. in [DIJ10][GEN10a][GEN09a] are very 
impractical. According to our measurements, the time needed to perform simple calculations is 
substantial. We believe that there still is a great opportunity for researchers to develop more 
efficient HES. 
As future work, we are planning to work on the optimization of the efficiency of the system. 
Processing can be parallelized in order to take advantage of multiple processors executing the 
encrypted requests. We will also investigate how to reduce the number of recryptions needed. 
Indeed, since the noise value can be bounded, decryption should be necessary only when the 
ciphertext cannot support an additional arithmetic operation.  
In the current system, the server does know the operation that was performed (SELECT, 
UPDATE, etc.). If we can encrypt the SQL circuits, the system will preserve the confidentiality 
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of the data and operations performed on these data. We believe that this new system can be the 
foundation of a highly secure cloud computing environment. The next chapter tackles this 
problem by proposing a system working over encrypted processes.  
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Chapter 5  
 
 
Encrypted Processes for Oblivious Data 
Retrieval 
5.1 Introduction 
The cloud computing technology is a distributed system by which multiple remote servers and 
applications are made available over the Internet to provide various capabilities. The latter 
include data storage, utilizing remote services, and handling complex computations that require 
powerful hardware resources. The main purpose of cloud computing is to extend the resources of 
each computer using the Internet. The cloud operates in an open environment and therefore 
several precautions should be taken to preserve the privacy of its clients. Although the cloud 
employs a set of protection techniques, these may not be effective in all situations, especially 
when dealing with sensitive data. In fact, clients with sensitive data require strong security 
measures before they can trust any cloud service. As a result, cloud’s provider must have the 
ability to (a) guarantee the privacy of clients’ data and (b) protect the security and privacy of 
clients operations in the cloud against the threat of de-compilation.   
Providing these abilities entice more clients to trust the cloud computing technology, however, 
has been a challenge as they require delegating computations without delegating access. 
Therefore, the need for a mechanism to allow the cloud to communicate with the client in a blind 
manner has been an important quest, where the cloud is able to execute clients’ queries without 
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having access to their contents or behavior. Such a mechanism can be achieved by utilizing the 
most recent version of HESs [GEN10a], which is the subject of this chapter.  
HES allow performing computations over encrypted data, based on addition and multiplication, 
without decryption. With these schemes, a client is able to publish only encrypted data and ask 
un-trusted parties (a cloud computing provider) to perform computations on his/her behalf. Using 
homomorphic encryption, an un-trusted cloud provider can perform some operations on the data 
without the need to decrypt the data. The final result of these computations is equivalent to these 
computations being performed on the clear data. This means that homomorphic encryption 
allows clients to preserve the privacy of their data, as only encrypted data will be available to the 
service provider. However, this technique is time-consuming as it executes a large number of 
operations to perform the requested queries, which is a major drawback. Nevertheless, the 
benefits of homomorphic encryption motivated research efforts to develop techniques that 
require lower delay overhead. 
In this chapter, we introduce novel homomorphic encryption circuits that are an extension of our 
previous chapter. In this latter, we proposed a set of homomorphic circuits that perform simple 
database queries over a database of encrypted data, without allowing the owner of that database 
to know the targeted records. In this chapter we use HES to develop a generic circuit that 
performs any database queries, instead of using n-circuits for n-different operations. Besides, we 
propose a mechanism to encrypt the circuit itself. The latter is achieved through circuit 
obfuscation. An obfuscated program is a circuit that hides the program’s original functionality 
while maintaining the same behavior. This technique is used to protect the internal state of a 
process from de-compilers and malicious attacks. As a result, the parties performing 
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computations on behalf of the client will neither have information about the data being 
manipulated nor the arithmetic operations (addition or multiplication) that are being executed. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we review the research 
contributions in the area circuit obfuscation.  In Section 5.3, we describe our technique to encrypt 
processes for oblivious data retrieval. In Section 5.4, we provide an implementation based on our 
scheme for a secure database system. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes our work. 
5.2 Related Work 
Circuit obfuscation has attracted research efforts in the last decade. However, mixed findings 
have been reported in the literature. In some cases, researchers have reported negative results 
about obfuscation [BOA01 and GOL05], while other researchers have demonstrated the 
opportunity to build an absolutely oblivious program that keeps the privacy of operations 
[KAI10, HAS09, SHA06, JIE07, GOL05, and LIN03]. In this section we discuss the findings of 
all of these studies. 
Boaz et al [BOA01] studied the possibilities to conceive a general obfuscator that preserves the 
same functionality as the original program, and whether such an approach can be widely used to 
protect software from attacks. The conclusion of their study was absolutely negative. They 
proved theoretically that such an obfuscator cannot be achieved by studying a set of functions 
that are not obfuscatable, such as one-way functions. However, the authors clearly indicated that 
homomorphic encryption techniques could be a promising track to construct a robust obfuscator 
system. 
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Goldwasser and Kalai [GOL05] extended the theoretical work of [BOA01] and confirmed the 
limits of these obfuscators’ robustness. They studied more functions that cannot be obfuscated, 
such as filter functions. 
In [GEN10a], Gentry demonstrated the most recent homomorphic encryption theories that paved 
the way for new promising techniques to build strong obfuscators. Kai-Min et al. [KAI10] used 
the theories presented in [GEN10a]. Their main idea is to check the loyalty of the remote party 
where the computation was delegated. However, checking if the remote agent gave back the right 
result does not guarantee the trustiness of the party. Therefore, it will be interesting to prevent a 
server from knowing what data is being manipulated. 
The authors in [HAS09], [SHA06], [JIE07], and [POP07] described various techniques that 
protect mobile agents while they are under full control. Hashmi and Brooke [HAS09] proposed a 
paradigm to protect mobile agents at runtime from static and dynamic attacks, while this 
program turned in un-trusted hosts. The paradigm consists of detecting if an agent meets an 
attack from malicious software using various parameters, such as the time calculated for an agent 
to finish its task in a specific environment. Shah et al [SHA06] proposed obfuscation techniques 
that act on the byte codes of java based mobile agents. Their techniques deny any attempt of 
reverse engineering by a deviant class file to extract the original source code. Jiehong et al 
[JIE07] used two techniques, namely, obfuscated control flow and time checking, to prevent 
malicious programs from knowing a mobile agent’s state. The first technique consists of 
substituting a set of instructions by a more complicated equivalent one, while the second 
technique calculates the execution duration to check if the node has performed more 
computations than needed. Popov et al [POP07] combined the obfuscated control flow, 
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mentioned above, with another technique that inserts some fake instructions to make it difficult 
to find the beginning of each instruction at runtime. 
Linn and Debray [LIN03] used the technique of obfuscating source code to make a statistically 
hard disassembling program. 
It is worth mentioning that all of the above techniques do not depend on encryption to fully 
protect the targeted program; they just produce an obfuscated form that makes it hard to 
understand the source code of a program. Therefore, the internal state and program’s behavior 
are not fully protected. In this chapter, we focus on the problem of performing private operations 
over encrypted data. This approach can effectively hide the internal state or the functionality of 
the targeted program. That is, we show that with our approach we are to secure the system 
against various malicious attacks. 
5.3 Secure Data and queries behavior 
Let us consider the following HES: 𝜀𝑝𝑘  𝑚 = 𝑐 = 𝑚 + 2 ∗ 𝑟 + 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑞; where c is the cipher text 
of bit m; 𝑝𝑘 is the public key; and r and q are two random integers [GEN10a]. The decryption 
scheme is as follows: 𝑚 =  𝑐 mod 𝑠𝑘 mod 2 where 𝑠𝑘 is the secret key. By carefully choosing 
the size of the keys 𝑝𝑘 and 𝑠𝑘 and the random values r and q, the encryption scheme is proved to 
be semantically secure [GEN10a]. This encryption scheme uses logical expressions that are 
implemented by a set of logical gates that form a system to achieve a specific need. It depends on 
the XOR and AND logical gates to implement the addition (add) and multiplication (mult) of 
ciphertexts. However, the fact that some systems consist of gates interrelated in a specific 
manner makes them very weak against de-compilation. As a result, most systems, especially 
those involving applications of databases, can be easily monitored. For example, an attacker can 
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detect what operations a client is requesting by noticing the gates that are in use and the 
information disclosed about their interconnection. It is essential to hide that low level 
information in order to provide higher level of protection for the clients’ privacy. To accomplish 
this protection, we propose to encrypt the information about the gates in use. Towards that, we 
deploy a black box that encrypts both add and mult gates to avoid all drawbacks resulting from 
disclosed schemes. The encryption of these gates propagates to the encryption of the whole 
circuit, forcing a malicious host to execute requests in a blind manner. This novel technique, 
implementing a new gate -named the Star gate, gives a requester the ability to preserve the 
privacy of his/her operations, and prevents the server executing the operations from tracing 
his/her steps. In Figure 5-1, we show a schematic of the Star gate, which performs the following 
logical relationship through three encrypted bits X, Y, and S: 
f S, X, Y =  S × X × Y ⊕  S ×  X ⊕ Y   
The Star gate takes as input three encrypted parameters: The two bits X=εpk  x  and Y=εpk  y , 
which are two operands to calculate, and S =εsk  s , which is used to configure the output to be 
either X × Y or X ⊕ Y. In fact, the decision of which operator the Star gate will generate as an 
output has been delegated to an encrypted item to maintain the privacy of the process. Therefore, 
we should not worry about the credibility of the executer, as they conduct the orders in complete 
ignorance. In a simple way, if we need to perform a safety operation mult or add, we just have to 
execute the Star by giving S= εsk  1  for the first operation and S= εsk  0  for the second, as 
shown in the two next relations: 
εpk  x ∗ y = εpk  1 ∗ εpk  x ∗ y + εpk (1)        ∗ εpk (x + y) 
εpk  x + y = εpk  0 ∗ εpk  x ∗ y + εpk (0)        ∗ εpk (x + y) 
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Figure 5-1: Star gate. 
 
Figure 5-2: Simplified representation of the star gate. 
Indeed, the representation of our schemas becomes complex as shown in Figure 5-1, since we 
replace each mult and add by a Star, which is not a simple gate. Therefore, to avoid this 
drawback we will adopt a new abstraction. In Figure 5-2, we provide a simplified representation 
of the Star.  
As systems based on logical expressions are widely accepted in cryptography, the encryption of 
logic gates described above can be a strong way to make such systems highly secure. For the rest 
of this section, we will use this encryption of gates to transform a partially secure system, which 
executes database queries, into a fully secure one without affecting the system’s functionality 
(hereafter called Secure-Executer).  
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In the previous chapter, we have developed a secure system that executes simple database 
queries over encrypted data to prevent the server from knowing which records are being 
manipulated. We proved that our approach could preserve privacy. However, the server could 
still know which operations were being executed. Such information may be used by malicious 
database owners to retrieve clients’ orientation relying on the nature of operations they perform. 
Therefore, we needed to develop a common tunnel to perform all operations, instead of creating 
n tunnels for n different operations, where the circuits are encrypted using the Star gate. The 
combination of these two techniques creates a new mechanism that performs database queries in 
a secure way, where the database owner has no knowledge of what the requested operations 
(SELECT, UPDATE…etc) are.  
The new system operates in three main steps, namely, localizing, identifying, and creating 
results. Basically, each sub-circuit initializes its flags and switchers from the client request as 
well as the request criterion v. The latter contains information about what the requester is 
searching the database for. The flags are used to configure the Star gate to perform an add or a 
mult, while the switchers are used to lead the circuit and draw the circuit path. 
The localizing step is an essential one when performing a request. This step focuses on finding 
each record R that matches the request in a database T by comparing the criterion v to each 
column c in the database’s records. This information is used in all the other sub-circuits that 
follow. Regardless of the operation sent by the client, the localizing step must be able to locate 
suitable records by turning over encrypted data. For this purpose, we designed a localizer schema 
that is made up of several branches, as shown in Figure 5-3. Only the requester has the right to 
decide the appropriate branch to use since each branch is associated with a specific operation.  
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Figure 5-3: The localizer schema. 
Whatever decision the client makes, the server will be ignorant of it, as the bit received by the 
server is encrypted. In other words, if the client chooses the encrypted bit value F = εpk  1  to be 
associated with a branch, the specified branch is taken into consideration and F =εpk  0  will be 
ignored. 
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The description discussed above can be formalized as: ∀R ∈ T:  
IR =  F1 ×   1 ⊕ ci ⊕ vi 
size −1
i=0
 ⊕  F2 × CR,size −1 ⊕  F3 × C′R,size −1  
With: 
CR,i =  
0, 𝑖 = 0
1⨁  ci × vi           × ci × CR,i−1              × vi × CR,i−1              , 𝑖 ≥ 1
  
And: 
C′R,i =  
0, 𝑖 = 0
1⨁ vi × ci           × vi × CR,i−1             × ci × CR,i−1              , 𝑖 ≥ 1
  
Where size is the number of bits in column c, ci is the i
th
 bit of column c, and vi  is the i
th
 bit of 
the request criterion v. F1, F2, and F3 are the three switchers sent by the client to decide which 
branch to use and which ones to ignore. The result IR  is a one bit value that is equal to 1 if v 
matches the value of column c, 0 otherwise. In the next sub-circuit, we identify the n
th
 record that 
matches the selection criteria. For that purpose, we consider η = B(n) to be the binary form of 
the index n represented by 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 bits. 
For each record R we calculate the following sum: 
∀R ∈ T: SR =  IR
i≤R
 
Then, we calculate an index I′R  : 
∀R ∈ T I′R = IR ×  (1 ⊕ηi
size −1
i=0
⊕ SR,i) 
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I′R  is equal to 1 if the record R is the n
th
 record that matches the selection criteria, 0 otherwise. 
At the final step, the creator applies the request to the T as follows: ∀R ∈ T 
R′ =   F4 × I′R ⊕  I′R × R ⊕   F4 × I′R ⊕ I′R 
                       
× U 
Where F4 is an encrypted flag that indicates the read/write operation’s state and U are the new 
values to put into the database. These values are equal to 0 if the client does not request an 
update to his/her records. This generic formula also allows hiding the operating state of R/W. 
Thus, in consultation and deletion cases, the true operation is hidden by adding a misleading 
update that does not change the content. Our system can also guarantee a highly secure system 
that can preserve all transactions’ state and content.  
This latter sub-circuit returns to the requester a result from his/her query. The result contains 
records from the SELECT request, or an indication that the records have been deleted (after a 
DELETE request) or updated (after an UPDATE request). This result is a table T’, which is built 
according to the following: 
∀ R, R′ ∈  T, T′ ∶   R′   =   
R if R is matching the criteria
0  otherewise
  
Finally, by adding all the records of table T′, we can retrieve the nth record Rs 
Rs =  R′
R′ ∈T′
 
If no record matches the selection criteria, a record containing zeros will be returned to the 
requester.  
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5.4 Implementation and tests 
In this section we present a prototype, named the Encrypted Database Queries Executer (EDQE), 
which we use to prove that it is possible to perform queries through encrypted processes. As 
shown in Figure 5-4, our system consists of three modules, the Requester, 
Encryption/Decryption, and the Performer. Once a client initiates a new database access, the 
Requester retrieves the request and prepares a datagram, as shown in Figure 5-5, that contains 
the search criterion, flags that suit the query and, the new data, in case the client wants to 
perform an UPDATE. Then, the datagram is sent to the Encryption/Decryption module to be 
encrypted in. The encryption is done to prevent the Performer from knowing what the client is 
requesting. This performer uses the encrypted datagram to search in an encrypted database where 
each record is 15 ×  104 bit length. Once it finishes performing the request, it sends the result 
back to the Encryption/Decryption module for decryption. Finally, the latter module terminates 
the circuit by sending back the plain result to the Requester to display it.  
Database queries are executed in the same general circuit controlled by the input flags. So, the 
fact that these flags are in an encrypted format, as shown in Figure 5-5, will prevent any third 
party from tracing our system. This makes our system highly secure against traceability and 
attacks.  
The prototype supports the following database operations: 
 SELECT with wildcard characters (*, ?) and relational operators (< >). 
 UPDATE with wildcard characters (*, ?) and relational operators (< >). 
 DELETE with wildcard characters (*, ?) and relational operators (< >). 
 Statistical operations like COUNT and AVG. 
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Figure 5-4: Circuit of performing requests. 
 
Figure 5-5: Datagram. 
In Figure 5-6, we show the result of the DELETE query.  
 
Figure 5-6: Client side of the application. 
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It is worth noting that all database statements require the same number of arithmetic operations. 
These statements differ only in the value of the encrypted flags sent by the client. 
Table 5.1 lists the number of arithmetic operations required to execute the general circuit over an 
encrypted database of 10 records.  
 Add & Mult Add Mult 
General circuit 819892 409892 410000 
Table 5.1: Number of arithmetic operations 
We note that we are using a simplified version of the FHES, called SHES. This technique 
enables us to execute encrypted processes within reduced time compared to the fully one, since it 
consumes less operations. 
 
Figure 5-7: Execution time. 
Figure 5-7 illustrates the performance in terms of the processing time consumed for different 
number of records. These results show that our system still suffers in performance, but it can be 
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considered as a first step towards a practical system that preserves the privacy of a process 
executed in a hostile environment. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Homomorphic encryption is a promising approach to strengthen the security measures of 
computing systems that manipulate sensitive data. This technique allows clients to rely on the 
services offered by remote servers, even though the integrity of these servers may be 
questionable. 
In this chapter, we have presented two novel techniques that use homomorphic encryption to 
preserve the confidentiality of clients’ data when storing this data at remote servers. In the first 
technique, we developed a global homomorphic circuit that processes all of the database queries 
that a hosting server can execute on behalf of the client, in order to hide the operation's nature . 
In the second technique, we strengthened the concept by encrypting the operation itself in such a 
way that the servers performing the operation can learn nothing about the requests of the client. 
Combined together, the techniques provide a complete confidentiality of both the data 
manipulated and the nature of queries being performed. 
In the next chapter, we customize the models developed in Chapter4 and Chapter5 to fully secure 
an interesting area, which is a mobility solution. We also enhance the approach by considering 
the noise value and giving related statistics.     
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Chapter 6  
 
Privacy Preserving Scheme for Location-
Based Services 
6.1 Introduction 
The growth of smart phones and mobile devices in both software and hardware capabilities have 
resulted in the emergence of a set of new products and internet services that guarantee new 
promising business models. Location-Based Services (LBSs) have attracted the utmost 
importance in this regard. These services rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS) or 
Network-Based Positioning, which are mainly used to determine the current position of a user, in 
order to define his/her location relatively to a business or a service (banks, restaurants, 
universities…etc). The user can enquire about that information by communicating wirelessly 
with an LBS server. The server uses the signal emitted by the user to locate him/her using Real-
time Locating Systems (RTLS) [CLA09]. Once the coordinates of the user are determined, the 
server responds with a list of all services surrounding the user’s position. 
LBSs have actually attracted the research and development community. However, LBSs suffer 
from a major security pitfall in terms of violating users’ privacy. In other words, as the LBS 
server gains knowledge of the users’ coordinates, this information can be manipulated by the 
server itself or by any malicious party to trace the movements of the users. Thereby, instead of 
using such a mechanism to facilitate lifestyle, it can easily turn over into an efficient tracking 
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tool. This problematic urged the research community to find a secure way to use LBSs without 
disclosing users’ private information. 
Strong protection for users’ information can be attained if the server is made capable of 
retrieving location-related information without being aware of the user’s position or the point of 
interests he/she is requesting. It is challenging to achieve the latter target as the server needs to at 
least know this search criterion to retrieve the requested information. In this chapter, we tackle 
this problem by using encryption schemes to retrieve data without violating the privacy of the 
users. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we review the related work 
that aimed at securing location-based services. Section 6.3 provides a detailed description of the 
circuits that makes it possible to respond requests in a blind fashion. Section 6.4 presents our 
prototype and the evaluation of its performance. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes our work and 
provides future research directions. 
6.2 Related work 
There are a number of approaches in the literature to solve the problem of privacy protection 
with location based services, including:  
 Cloaking. 
 Generation of dummies. 
 PIR. 
Gruteser and Grunwald [GRU03] and Chow et al. [CHO06] have based their approaches on K-
anonymity [GED05, MOK06, REI79, and GED04]. The latter concept relies on hiding the user’s 
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location among K-1 neighbors. The main idea behind this concept is to send a box of locations 
instead of only the true one, whereby the probability to guess the user’s location is always less 
than 1/K. All techniques relying on K-anonymity use a middleware (the anonymizer) [GRU03, 
CHO06, GED05, MOK06, REI79, and GED04]. This anonymizer is a third party responsible for 
creating a Cloaking Region (CR), which contains the true user’s location, as well as K-1 other 
neighbors. With such a technique, a typical scenario can be a user trying to localize the nearest 
bank. The user sends his/her requests (including his/her credentials) to the anonymizer through a 
wireless network. Thereafter, the anonymizer, which keeps the locations of all current users, 
authenticates the requester first and chooses a set of K-1 neighbors to create a CR that can be 
sent instead of the user’s position. This way, the risk of violating the user’s privacy is reduced by 
making it difficult to locate the position that has triggered the process (since the server is 
answering the whole CR). However, this approach suffers from several drawbacks. Firstly, the 
users’ data is still revealed to a third party (the anonymizer) and thus the problem of preserving 
the user’s privacy has not been solved. That is, we still have no guarantees that the anonymizer 
cannot be misused if a malicious hacker gains access to it. Secondly, the anonymizer needs to 
update the current location of all the subscribed users repeatedly, which will require a permanent 
communication and remote monitoring of the users, which is a clear violation of the users’ 
privacy.  
Finally, the robustness of these approaches depends totally on having a relatively big number of 
neighbors at the time of receiving the requests. Therefore, depending on a middleware is far from 
being a perfect solution to secure location-dependent queries and hence any secure solution need 
to communicate directly with the Location Based Server without any intermediate parties. 
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Kido et al. [KID05] and You et al. [YOU07] have proposed a new technique to hide users’ 
location and trajectory by sending several queries instead of only one. The technique depends on 
creating several fake queries with fake identities in addition to the real query, thereby, the LBS 
server will not be able to identify. Apparently, the perfection of this mechanism depends on the 
number of fake requests generated; the more fake queries generated the more robust and secure 
the system becomes. The problem with this technique is that as the number of requests sent out 
by a user grows, the LBS may suspect that it is under an attack and thus the requests may be 
ignored. Moreover, receiving a big number of requests can slow down the server’s response time 
significantly. 
Ghinita et al. [GHI08] have proposed a novel approach based on the Private Information 
Retrieval (PIR) scheme [GEN05] as well as Grid Cells (GCs). The PIR scheme is used to 
retrieve data from a database without revealing the content of the queries or the identity of the 
user. GCs technique is used to request a reduced set of LBS which represents the area of interest 
to the user. The GCs firstly enquire from the server about the appropriate cells, and then retrieve 
anonymously suitable objects. Ghinita’s technique succeeds in solving some of the issues 
associated with the abovementioned techniques. However, it relies on unguaranteed expectations 
like extensive data processing on the user’s side. In most cases, the user is submitting the request 
through a mobile phone that has very limited processing capabilities. 
Rebollo-Monedero and Forné [REB10] have proposed a mathematical model to minimize the 
risk of privacy violations in PIR’s queries. They presented a promising system to enhance LBS 
exchange protocol and make communication more secure, despite using a TTP server as 
middleware between the users and the LBS server. 
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6.3 Secure location based services 
To preserve the privacy of the user while interacting with the LBS server, we present in this 
section a novel approach based on HES to preserve the privacy of the user while interacting with 
the LBS server.  
As mentioned in previous chapters, HESs allow performing arithmetic operations (additions and 
multiplications) over encrypted data, meaning that the result of an arithmetic operation would be 
the same whether applied over plain bits or encrypted bits. Our work uses a symmetric 
encryption scheme as a basis to request LBS anonymously and guarantee retrieving only suitable 
data. 
 
Figure 6-1: Architecture for secure location based services. 
Figure 6-1 depicts a high level architecture of the proposed Location Based Service. A user 
encrypts the request, which consists mainly of the user’s geographical position and the category 
of the service (Bank, University, etc.) he/she is looking for, and then sends the encrypted request 
 77 
to the LBS server. This latter performs a search on the location database and produces an 
encrypted result that matches the search criterion. The encrypted records are returned to the user 
and upon decryption, the requesting party gets the location of the nearest services. 
In this approach we use a symmetric encryption scheme to conceive our homomorphic model. 
Symmetric schemes have the particularity to use the secret key for both encryption and 
decryption, whereby this characteristic could enhance performance by working on shorter 
records. This encryption scheme is defined as: 𝑐 = 𝑚 + 2 ∗ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝑞 where c= εsk  m  is the 
cipher text of a bit m encrypted under the secret key 𝑠𝑘; 𝑟 and 𝑞 are two random integers. 2 ∗ r is 
called the noise of the cipher text. By carefully choosing the size of the secret key 𝑠𝑘 and the 
random values 𝑟 and 𝑞, this encryption scheme is proved to be semantically secure [GEN09a]. 
The size of each of these elements is based on a security parameter called λ , whereby 𝑠𝑘 is an 
odd λ5-bit number, and 𝑟 and 𝑞 are λ-bit and λ2-bit numbers, respectively. As a consequence, 
each bit encrypted using this scheme would be represented in at most   1 + Log10 Q   decimal 
digits, where 𝑄  is λ7 -bit number. Furthermore, this scheme can support a finite number of 
arithmetic operations over the same ciphertexts, since it depends mainly on the ratio 𝑠𝑘 /r. 
Thereby, we are able to decrypt successfully a bit 𝑐 as long as the noise value is less than 𝑠𝑘. It is 
obvious to notice that this value doubles after each addition and squares after each 
multiplication. Therefore, our proposed process must be carefully executed such that it can 
terminate tasks before reaching the upper limit of the noise value. It is worth noting that the 
ability to support a high number of operations depends mainly on the parameter of security λ. If 
the latter is relatively large, then the ratio 𝑠𝑘/r will be large enough to support a considerable 
number of computations. However, an encryption scheme that uses a big value of λ (to allow a 
high secure system) produces big encrypted values, whereby the time needed to perform 
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operations will be relatively long. In our system we use the Karatsuba multiplication algorithm 
[URL01] to manipulate operations over big integer values. This algorithm allows performing 
more than 106 integer operations in less than one second (tested on a personal computer with 2 
GB memory and for the security parameter λ = 5). This is a practical situation, especially if we 
consider the size (order of 278125 ) of the encrypted values generated by λ. 
In our system, processing a user’s request goes through the following four main steps: 
1. Localizing category. 
2. Localizing services. 
3. Filtering services. 
4. Generating results. 
We demonstrate how these steps work by the following example. Assuming that the user needs 
to enquire about the nearby hospitals, he/she sends an encrypted request that represent both 
his/her current location (x, y) and the enquired category (hospital in this case). Once the server 
receives the request, it uses the user’s position to calculate distances and localize nearby services. 
Thereafter, it selects only the objects enquired about, and sends them back to the user in 
encrypted form. We note that the described encryption scheme, allows performing operations 
between plain and encrypted bits and the resulting record becomes encrypted. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2: LBS's Structure. 
 
 79 
In the next sub-sections, we provide complete details on each of these main processing steps. 
6.3.1 Location categories 
The LBS database is structured as a tree, as shown in Figure 6-2. Thus, localizing suitable 
objects must be preceded by localizing the associated category. This process requires an 
exhaustive search, since the server doesn’t have access to the content of the user’s request since 
it’s encrypted. The server needs to compare, bit by bit, the encrypted category, requested by the 
user, to all available categories in the database. The following formula is used for that 
comparison: 
∀𝐶 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑆  𝐼𝐶 =    1 ⊕ 𝑐𝑖 ⊕ 𝑣𝑖 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒−1
𝑖=0
 
Where 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the number of bits used to encode one category, 𝑣𝑖  is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  bit in the enquired 
category, and 𝑐𝑖  is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  bit in category 𝑐 that is available in the LBS’s database. 
This formula focuses on comparing the two categories 𝑐  and  𝑣  by verifying whether their 
sequences of bits are similar or not, knowing that c is encrypted. Towards that end, we compare 
separately each couple (ci ,vi) by calculating 1 ⊕ ci ⊕ vi. The latter results in an encrypted value 
that either equals to εsk  1 , if ci  is an encrypted form of vi , or εsk  0  otherwise. Then, it is 
possible to verify whether the compared categories are the same, by checking if all generated 
values are εsk  1 . Therefore, we calculate the product IC  of these encrypted bits and if we get 
εsk  1 , then the categories are the same. Otherwise, we confirm that at least one pair (ci, vi) 
exists such that vi ≠ ci, meaning that the compared sequences are not the same. The values of  IC  
are used by the server to filter out the objects that belong to the enquired category. We should 
finally mention that each entry in IC  will have a noise in the order of  size ×  λ + 1  -bit value, 
since it is the product of size encrypted bits, which are in the order of  λ + 1 -bit. 
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Figure 6-3: Noise value produced while localizing categories. 
In Figure 6-3 we show the noise values, produced from localizing categories, with respect to the 
bit sizes of these categories. 
6.3.2 Localizing services 
In this sub-section we describe the mechanism that locates objects that surround the user’s 
position. 
The aim of our approach is to allow users to find the nearest targets while preventing LBS from 
identifying their positions. Therefore, we use the encrypted position  εsk  X  , εsk  Y    instead of 
the real one and calculate, based on the Manhattan distance [URL02], the distance separating 
them from the stored targets.  
This distance, depicted in Figure 6-4, is calculated between two points A =  XA , YA  and B= 
 XB , YB  as follows: 
 d A, B =  XB +  (1 ⊕ XA ) +  YB +  1 ⊕ YA     
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Where the operations 1 ⊕ XA  and 1 ⊕ YA  represent the two’s complement form of  XA  and YA  
respectively.  
 
Figure 6-4: Manhattan distance between two points. 
The relevant positions are presented as a set of bits, and therefore, binary addition is mandatory 
to calculate the distance. This arithmetic operation results in noise values ranging from λ-bit to 
 sizeXY × λ -bit values, which are produced when using the same encrypted bits for calculating 
both the current bit Si and the carry bit Si+1. Here, λ, sizeXY, and Si  are the original noise, the bit 
length of the coordinate  X, Y , and the ith  bit in the resulted addition S. In other words, this 
distance produces a noise value confined between 2λ-bit and  sizeXY2 × λ -bit, since it is the 
addition of two sequences with  sizeXY × λ -bit noise value.  
 
Figure 6-5: Noise value when calculating distances. 
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In Figure 6-5 we show the noise caused by this step in terms of the coordinate’s bit length. 
6.3.3 Filtering targets 
The distance that is separating the targets from the user allows the server to decide which records 
to suggest for that user. Although the trivial solution is to send back all of the available targets 
and leave it for the user to filter these targets, this behavior may lead to an excessive processing 
time and transmission bandwidth. This is because the user must decrypt the results before 
filtering them which is a time-consuming procedure. Moreover, forcing a user to receive and 
process many objects irrelevant to his/her search may unnecessarily waste the resources of the 
user. Therefore, we propose here two novel approaches to mitigate this situation. In one 
approach, we use a blind sorting process that arranges the targets based on their encrypted 
distance, and then chooses the closest ones (number of records is known). In the second 
approach, we blindly localize the points that belong to a coverage area. In what follows we 
discuss these two approaches, the details about their functionality, and we highlight their benefits 
and drawbacks. 
6.3.3.1 Blind sorting 
We exploit the PIR methodology and propose a novel circuit that sorts encrypted values. That is, 
our circuit allows us to arrange the available locations based on their encrypted distance. Our 
novel circuit uses the principle of blind comparison. This principle compares two sequences of 
bits, of length n, by performing binary subtraction between them. The nth  bit resulting from this 
subtraction is used to check the nature of the comparison, since this latter is negative whether the 
bit value is εsk  1  and positive otherwise. Blind comparison, however, suffers from a major 
drawback related to the value of noise that grows rapidly before finishing the process. Therefore, 
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we enhance the model by proposing a novel technique that divides the set of bits into two parts, 
namely, low and high, and then compares these parts separately, as shown in Figure 6-6. 
 
Figure 6-6: Translating the comparison of two set of bits to their low and high parts. 
The partial comparisons conducted on the low and high parts of the targeted sequences are used 
to finalize the comparison between the two sequences using the following equation in order to 
reset the increased noise value:  
𝐵𝑐 =  𝐵′′𝑐 + 𝐵′𝑐 × 𝐵′′𝑐       
where, 𝐵𝑐 , 𝐵′𝑐  and 𝐵′′𝑐  are the resulting encrypted bits of the comparison, the low part, and the 
high part, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1: Nature of operations from calculated bit value 
𝐵′𝑐  𝐵′′𝑐  𝐵𝑐  Order 
εsk  1  εsk  1  εsk  1  ≥ 
εsk  1  εsk  0  εsk  1  ≥ 
εsk  0  εsk  1  εsk  1  ≥ 
εsk  0  εsk  0  εsk  0  < 
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In Table 6.1 we show the relation between these values, and Figure 6-7 shows how our technique 
stabilizes the value of the noise, since in both low and high parts we reset the noise value when 
starting each part. 
 
Figure 6-7: Noise value resulting from the new circuit compared to the old one. 
Our comparison circuit is then used to arrange the selected objects in a certain order. We 
compare the two first elements to see if their associated bit Bc  is equal to εsk  1 . If so, we 
permute these elements, otherwise we keep them in their original order. This process is repeated 
for each adjacent pair of elements until all of the elements are compared. After that, the full 
comparison is repeated N times from the beginning, where N is the number of items available 
in R,  the set of targets belonging to a category.  
We should mention here that having Bc  in an encrypted form may hinder the swap of bits 
described above. This problem is overcome by using a passkey formula that allows the executor 
to use the encrypted Bc  to apply the comparison. The passkey formula is defined as follows: 
∀𝑅1 ∈ 𝑅 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑅2 ∈ 𝑅 : 
  𝑅1𝑛𝑒𝑤 =  𝐵𝑐  ×  𝑅1𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝐵𝑐    × 𝑅2𝑜𝑙𝑑  
𝑅2𝑛𝑒𝑤 =  𝐵𝑐      ×  𝑅1𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝐵𝑐  × 𝑅2𝑜𝑙𝑑  
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Where R1old , R2old  and  R1new , R2new  are the old and new values of the compared entries. 
Figure 6-8 shows the performance of the latter technique in terms of the noise values it achieves. 
The technique generates high values of noise because of the fact that the same encrypted values 
are used N2 times before arranging all of the items.  
 
Figure 6-8: Noise value generated from arranging entries. 
Therefore, unless the security parameter λ is made big enough (i.e., λ > 15), this circuit does not 
perform well due to the maximum noise that is reached before finishing the process. For that 
reason, we propose a lighter technique that focuses on finding the targets that belong to a specific 
area, instead of arranging all the objects and then choosing the nearest one, in such a way to filter 
out the suitable entries while keeping reduced noise values. 
6.3.3.2 Coverage area 
Objects can be chosen based on the specific area, surrounding the user’s location within a 
radiusP, as shown in Figure 6-9. For that purpose, we compare distances, calculated in the third 
step to P and then all associated Bc  will form a set of encrypted bits called LR . Thus, the location 
belongs to the specified area only if LR,i is equal to εsk  1 . Furthermore, each category in the 
 86 
database T will have a corresponding  LR  that indicates anonymously whether a target is suitable 
or not. The fact that the content of 𝐿𝑅  is encrypted forces us to find a special process to extract 
only 𝐿𝑅,𝑖  that are equal to εsk  1 . Therefore, we need first to calculate the sum of 𝐿𝑅  using the 
equation: 
∀𝑅 ∈ 𝑇: 𝑆𝑅 =  𝐿𝑅
𝑖≤𝑅
 
 
Figure 6-9: Coverage area. 
This sum is calculated using elementary symmetric polynomials since this technique keeps the 
noise value at the order of n, whereby n is the size of LR . It is then possible to localize the  i
th  
valid target by calculating the new sequence L′R  as:  
∀𝑅 ∈ 𝑇 𝐿′𝑅 = 𝐿𝑅 ×  (1 ⊕𝜂𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
⊕𝑆𝑅,𝑖) 
Where 𝜂𝑖  is the binary representation of the index of the element to select. Moreover, 𝐿′𝑅  
contains only one bit value equal to εsk  1  (the index to localize) while all others are equal 
to εsk  0 . This sequence leads to constructing a new database 𝑇
′ , of rows 𝑅′ , that contains only 
the targets that belong to the coverage area. The new database 𝑇′ can be formed as follows: 
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∀𝑅 ∈ 𝑇,∀𝑅′ ∈ 𝑇′ ∶  𝑅′ =  (𝐿′ 𝑅,𝑖  ×  𝑅𝑖)
𝑖≤𝑅
 
Where Ri is the i
th  target available in the enquired category. 
Looking for objects in a specific area produces an acceptable noise value. This is achieved due to 
the fact that an important number of records can be supported and the circuit can be terminate 
before reaching the noise’s limit. In Figure 6-10 we show the noise produced in this stage. 
 
Figure 6-10: Noise value generated while filtering objects in a specific category. 
6.3.4 Generating results 
The last step enables the server to select only the rows R′ that belong to the appropriate category. 
For that purpose we use the sequence of bits IC , that is calculated during the first step, and then 
multiply it to the locations R′  that are available in the fixed perimeter. After that, we calculate the 
resulting location as follows: 
∀R′ ∈ T′:R′′ = IC × R′   
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6.4 Implementation and results 
In this section we study the performance of our proposed system. In Figure 6-11 we show the 
data flow of our proposed system. A user can auto-locate himself/herself (the region where he 
belongs as well as his position) using smart phone capabilities. Then, the user’s software 
encrypts both his coordinates and the type of services he/she is targeting, and sends them to the 
server. The server retrieves the requested targets depending on the encrypted information. 
Thereafter, it sends these encrypted targets to the client to be decrypted and viewed by the user. 
 
Figure 6-11: Data flow. 
 
Figure 6-12: Number of records supported for different values of λ. 
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Our system has a limitation in terms of the number of records it can support. As the number of 
the stored targets grows, the system needs to conduct a significant number of arithmetic 
operations. We may even reach the upper limit of the noise value before extracting all the targets, 
and a successful decryption will not be guaranteed. We can overcome this problem by using 
large values of security parameter λ.  
Our experimental results are shown in Figures 6-12 and 6-13. Our experiments are conducted on 
a personal computer with 2 GB memory and dual core CPU of 2 GHz. Visual Studio C++ is used 
as tools for programming.  
Figure 6-12 depicts the performance in terms of the number of records per region we can support 
as a function of λ.  
 
Figure 6-13: Processing time. 
Figure 6-13 illustrates the performance in terms of the processing time consumed in each case. 
This figure shows that whenever the coverage area gets bigger, the number of operations 
increases, while the number of records supported gets lesser. 
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6.5 Conclusion and Perspectives 
The concept of answering location-related information for encrypted positions is promising to 
improve security needs. Indeed, such a mechanism can strongly attract the attention of 
researchers as it supports the preservation of the users’ privacy. 
In this chapter we developed a novel fully secure location-based mechanism based on a HES. We 
described the circuits that allow a LBS server to process encrypted inputs to retrieve targeted 
records that match the user’s request. We also discussed the limitations and drawbacks of our 
proposed system and suggested some solutions to make it more practical. The performance of 
our system was tested through extensive experiments to extract useful results related to the noise 
generated and the processing time consumed. 
As future work, we are planning to improve the performance of the encryption scheme to be able 
to support a large number of services. This step is mandatory to make it possible for a 
commercial deployment of our LBS system. 
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Chapter 7  
 
 
Encrypted trust-based routing protocol 
7.1 Introduction 
Ad-hoc Wireless Network is a set of dynamic nodes connected to each other without any 
physical liaison or pre-conceived infrastructure. This technology, which is suitable for dynamic 
topologies, has attracted a valuable attention from scientific community. Whereas, researchers 
have discussed various aspects to conceive a dynamic strong architecture that matches its 
counterpart based on some configured parameters. In this area, the routing protocols attract the 
utmost priority since it focuses on how a packet can be transported over a dynamic network. 
The Routing, in an Ad-hoc Wireless environment, relies on the voluntary and collaboration of 
nodes to forward a packet from source to destination. However, this confidence may sometimes 
be expensive in a no secure topology, since malicious and selfish nodes may mislead this 
collaboration and make packets’ delivery probabilistic. In a natural way, one prefers to cooperate 
with only faithful collaborators or at least assigns to them packets with high priority. In this 
context, an interesting approach has been proposed [PIR04], to avoid selfishness behavior, which 
is based on a trust mechanism to elect next collaborating nodes. It relies on the evaluation of 
each node toward its neighbors, where this evaluation affects in-nodes a trust value that is 
continuously updated according to the degree of cooperation. Trust values are then used to define 
a trust route. However, many security problems arise in this subject, whereby how neighbors are 
evaluated is disclosed as well as the exact trust value. Since, no security mechanisms are 
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involved to protect this sensitive information. Therefore, in this approach we focus on 
developing tracks that allow protecting privacy issues while keeping the same efficiency and 
robustness. Where, Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Multi-hop Homomorphic concept could 
be perfectly employed. 
FHES are efficient manners to manipulate encrypted data in a blind fashion. Such flexibility 
encourages publishing encrypted data and delegate safely processing to third parties. In routing 
purposes this technique is well aligned, since each node can perform its trust circuit and 
communicate only an encrypted useful evaluation to its neighbors. This way, nodes protect their 
privacy and intimacy when collaborating in an Ad-hoc network. On the other hand, the FHE 
concept is bounded by the number of circuits participating on the same computation. Since in the 
output of a circuit, the resulted ciphertext is no fresher as it was in entry, hence FHE properties 
might be no more valid. To avoid this limitation, we involve a mechanism called "Adapter" that 
implements multi-hop concept to preserve FHE properties even with several hops. Such a 
technique allows us to develop an efficient and correct secure trust based routing protocol for an 
Ad-hoc wireless network.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 we review the related work 
that aimed at trust routing protocol. Section 7.3 provides an overview of routing techniques as 
well as their limits. Section 7.4 presents our solution that deals with multi-hop limits and 
presents our proposition that aims at secure trust based routing protocol, while Section 7.5 details 
the solution and describes the designed protocol. In section 7.6 we describe briefly the 
performance of this protocol. Finally, Section 7.7 concludes our work and provides future 
research directions. 
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7.2 Related work 
In this section, we briefly describe other works that aim at define trust mechanisms or aim at 
secure routing protocol in Ad-hoc wireless environment. 
A. A. Pirzada et al. have defined a trust mechanism [PIR04] over a reactive routing protocol. 
They have proposed a model where each node in an Ad-hoc wireless environment maintains an 
evaluation procedure to reward or punish nodes in future collaborations. The trust value, which is 
based on transactions’ history and the forwarding quality, is then shared with other nodes to 
choose a trust path. However, exposing personal experience to a public network threats nodes' 
privacy and allows malicious module to control the network.  
R. K. Nekkanti and C.-W. Lee have proposed in [NEK04] a trust based adaptive routing protocol 
that denies nodes which are not affected to access route information about routes' path. 
Furthermore, this contribution has proposed a protocol that uses different kind of encryptions 
that vary according to the nature of nodes and their trust level. These techniques are first 
employed to protect route privacy and then to save energy while keeping a smooth functioning.  
On one side, S.-H. Chou et al. have adopted in [CHO11] a trust based reputation mechanism for 
the reactive routing protocol DSR. This contribution has proposed a model that detects malicious 
and selfish nodes, and then denies them, becoming a part of the protocol. On the other side, K. 
Sanzgiri et al. have suggested in [SAN02] a secure routing protocol based on authentication 
mechanisms.  
Moreover, C. Zhang et al. have provided in [ZHA10] a formal study of trust based Ad-hoc 
wireless Network. The proposed work has discussed several subjects regarding this protocol, 
 94 
such as correctness, respecting optimal trajectory to construct paths and distributive of trust 
branches.  
Although the contributions, mentioned above, discussed carefully various aspects that apply trust 
techniques to routing protocols for a secure matter. None of them has addressed the privacy of 
this trust model privacy and how this entity should be protected, whereby the way nodes are 
trusted must be kept confidential as well as trust values. 
7.3 Trust-Based routing protocol 
7.3.1 Routing protocol  
The wireless Ad-hoc Network is a typical kind of reactive protocols, which has a standalone 
architecture that does not refer any pre-existed infrastructure to define its topology. As dynamic 
nodes forming the network, behave in collaborative mode to construct on-demand paths and then 
route packets node by node until reaching the destination. This kind of network is widely used in 
a variety of applications and has been introduced in many systems where minimal configuration 
and quick deployment are required. However, this mechanism suffers from a major drawback 
concerning quality of routing as well as delivery guarantee. Since the protocol is mainly based on 
nodes’ cooperation and voluntary to announce nodes’ availability and broadcast packets hop 
after hop. Thus, the protocol falls down when a malicious node colludes with other elements to 
control the network, or when some nodes refuse to collaborate to save energy for instance. 
Therefore, the selection of nodes that cooperate together should be done carefully, so a protected 
and safely environment could be provided. This way, several solutions have been proposed to 
select suitable nodes based on their level of commitment, especially trust based routing 
technique. 
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7.3.2 Trust-Based routing 
The trust concept implied into routing protocols consists of selecting collaborating nodes based 
on their involvement and the degree of faithfulness. Such factors are extracted using cooperation 
history and reputation of the nodes, whereby each node believes its neighbors through the level 
of successful transfer, respect for packages’ priority and their availability. A trust value is then 
assigned to each node by its predecessors, helping to construct a trusted path when a route 
request is enquired. However, the manner by which nodes are evaluated is not fully protected 
and a given node can easily extract how it is evaluated and even the exact trust value. Therefore, 
it is important to hide the criteria used to assess nodes as well as the degree of belief, since these 
elements are essential to ensure a trust routing and to deny malicious elements to control the 
network. For this purpose, our contribution aims at protecting nodes’ privacy and to allow them 
sharing their experience safely. This novel technique is based on a FHES and the Multi-hop 
homomorphic encryption scheme. 
7.4 Multi-hop homomorphic encryption schemes 
7.4.1 Fully homomorphic encryption scheme 
The Homomorphic encryption is an effective data protection, since a client can only publish 
encrypted records of his data and then delegate to other parties using and processing these values 
without decryption. These schemes guarantee a successful decryption after many operations over 
encrypted circuits. Regardless of problems that the scheme still suffers from (time consuming, 
limited number of operations, etc), it is considered as a novel way of cryptography that is 
providing great added values to security issues. Although, some concepts must be developed in 
order to clarify different sides of this technique and be able to decide what it can and cannot be 
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achieved, such as double encryption, homomorphism using different keys. One of these concepts 
and which is useful in our contribution is the Multi-hop Encryption Scheme (MHES). 
In this chapter, we use the same polynomial public key encryption scheme developed in previous 
chapters which can be designed as  εpk  m = c =  m + 2 ∗ r + pk ∗ q , where m is a bit value, r 
a random integer, 𝑞  the security number and pk  the public key. The combination of these 
elements results c which is an encrypted integer form of  m . Homomorphic circuit can then 
accept encrypted values and successfully compute a set of operations to result another encrypted 
values which are correctly decrypted only by the party owning the secret key sk, see Figure 7-1. 
However, in case of multiple circuits acting on the same encrypted data before decryption, see 
Figure 7-2, requires a specific processing, for that we rely on the MHES to deal with. MHES 
consists of providing the possibility to process an encrypted entry using different sequenced 
circuits. However, this issue is not as easy as it appears, since in circuits’ output, the ciphertext is 
no fresher as it was in entry, and by the fact a correct decryption is not guaranteed. Therefore, an 
alternative way should be proposed to preserve FHE in a Multi-hop environment. 
 
Figure 7-1: Process encrypted values. 
 
Figure 7-2: Multi-hop encryption. 
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7.4.2 Multi-hop fully homomorphic encryption scheme 
Gentry et al. [GEN10b] have discussed this issue in the case of double encryption, and proposed 
a solution based on the Secure Function Evaluation [SCH08] and the Yao’s Garbled circuit 
[YAO82]. This solution consists of extending the principle of two-party computation to support 
i-hop HES for a fixed integer i. Recall that two-party computation allows performing a circuit 
with Heterogeneous inputs. Namely, a server Bob who owns a circuit C can combine his input x 
(known) with another input y (unknown) to execute its circuit for these values, while ignoring 
the exact value of y and without revealing the value of its input x. This technique arises as a 
typical solution of Millionaires’ problem that aspires deciding who is the richest without 
revealing the wealth of both participants. On the other hand, the fact that Gentry relies on such 
mechanism to fix i-hop theory is discouraging as far as it is promising, since the solution inherits 
all drawbacks of Yao’s garbled circuits, such as pre-calculating the whole circuit as well as 
transferring from circuit to another the whole truth table, in addition of its current limitations 
especially time consuming. Despite, the proposed solution is suitable for a topology using many 
circuits with different public keys.  
In this chapter, which consists to secure trust based routing protocol, there is a slight difference 
compared to i-hop HES discussed by Gentry.  
The main difficulty with an environment including several circuits is that a first module C1 acts 
on the initial fresh ciphertext sent by the client and outputs a processed one. This latter should be 
given then as input to another module C2  and so on. However, most of times the processed 
ciphertext does not preserve the same properties than a fresh one, and does not suit exactly what 
a circuit expects from its predecessor. Therefore, we involve a novel mechanism called 
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“Adapter” that allows us to transform and customize an output to a set of gates suiting the input 
of the next circuit if there is one. Namely, when a circuit finishes its processing and before 
forwarding the output, it checks first how much entries a next node is requiring. Then, it uses the 
"Adapter" to redraw the output to be exactly what next circuit needs. This way, we form a single 
chain with several links including all modules that should process client's input, see Figure 7-3.  
 
Figure 7-3: Multi-hop architecture using the adapter concept. 
7.4.3 The Adapter 
The adapter concept has resulted from the possibility to transform a set of gates to a new 
sequence while keeping the same functionality. The new mechanism consists of adapting an 
output to a next input to form an homogeneous multi-hop HES. However, the "Adapter" concept 
could be considered as violation of privacy, since an equivalent part of a circuit is shared with its 
next processor. Thus, such information might disclose important circuits' characteristics. 
Therefore, we protect privacy issue and nature of circuits by using a third kind of logical gates 
named "Star". This latter, which has been already proposed the chapter 2, consists of encrypting 
an ordinary gate to hide whether it is "AND" or "XOR".  
Recall, Star gate accepts three encrypted bit values. These values represent the two operands as 
well as a flag which configures the novel operator to be either a "XOR" or "AND" gate. Thus, a 
circuit based on star gates refers to a black box that protect circuit privacy, and make from 
"Adapter" technique a safely one.  
 99 
To profit from Star gate strengths, we propose to conceive all circuits as many interrelated "Star" 
gates. Since, this constraint enables these circuits to protect their processing technique and map 
easily new outputs to next inputs, which realize Adapter concept, without revealing any content. 
Thus, the "Adapter" concept could not be considered as weakness, since this operation does not 
disclose any information about the circuit as far as it helps to form one chain.  
7.5 Encrypted trust-based routing protocol 
In this chapter we develop a new mechanism to compute the path between a source node and a 
destination node, based on the trust metric and the Multi-hop homomorphic mechanism 
described above, in the goal to provide a secure Ad-hoc Wireless topology for a safely mutual 
cooperation. We assume that a routing algorithm is used to compute the routes to the destination 
prior to the establishment of a trusted path to the destination, as well as factors measuring level 
of faithfulness are already known. In this topology, all nodes maintain their trust database 
including summary of all transactions with in-neighbors, which is represented as a trust value 
associated to each collaborating node.  
In our protocol the source node begins by generating both public and secret keys, which are used 
as bases for the Multi-hop HES. This node executes then its trust circuit and calculates trust 
value that corresponds to each in-neighbor, before selecting among them the most confident to 
participate in the routing path. Also, it prepares a RR packet carrying the public key, destination 
node and next hop. Moreover, the current element checks number of inputs required by the next 
hop, and transforms its output using the “Adapter” to a set of encrypted values. These values 
represent wires that should be used by the next collaborator, where each three values form one 
star gate. Thereafter, it maps the generated gates to the RR packet, as well as a field containing 
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encrypted trust value of the most confident next hop. The RR is then forwarded to this latter to 
continue discovering the trusted path. Each node receiving a RR verifies first whether the 
destination is among their in-nodes. It proceeds by forwarding the packet without making any 
changes if this is the case. Otherwise, it begins by dismantling the received packet and extracting 
the public key and the encrypted accumulated trust value. Thereafter, the node retrieves the set of 
gates sent by the previous node, and links them to its circuit to continue calculating a trust path. 
Then, it changes RR content by mapping a trust next hop as well as updating the accumulated 
trust value for the constructed path as well as the output of “Adapter” mechanism. RR is then 
transmitted to the concerned node. The protocol follows this way until access the destination 
node, see Figure 7-4. This latter sends back a RP to the source including the whole path from 
source to destination, as well as the encrypted trust value associated to the elected path. Finally, 
the source node is the only actor able to decrypt global trust value, without being aware of the 
one associated to each arc.  
 
Figure 7-4: Accumulate encrypted trust value T from source to destination. 
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7.6 Evaluation and results 
In this section we discuss the performance of the proposed protocol and its impact to an ordinary 
trust based mechanism. The performance of our system is mainly based on the parameter of 
security λ, the bigger this parameter is the more secure the system becomes. In return, the system 
will deal with huge operations when using big values of λ.  
We study the case of an Ad-hoc network with 20 different nodes where we should select a 
trusted path and accumulate blindly the trust value associated. Each node in this topology first 
needs to evaluate its in-neighbors, and then updates the current trust value before forwarding the 
packet. This trust value, varying from 1 to 10 to represent the lower and the higher level of trust 
respectively, can be represented in 4 bits. While its encrypted form is at order of 4 × λ 5 bits. 
On the other hand, each node participating in the protocol should perform 20 additions and 8 
multiplications (homomorphic operations over encrypted values) to update the previous trust 
value. Meaning that to calculate a path in a network of 20 nodes we need to compute at most 400 
additions and 160 multiplications.  
We note that for faster computations, we rely on Karatsuba algorithm [URL01] which is suitable 
for operations over big integers. This algorithm allows performing more than 109  integer 
operations in less than one second (tested on a PC with a 6 GB of RAM memory at a security 
parameter λ = 3).  
We show in Table 7.1, the needed time to compute an encrypted trust path according to different 
value of λ in a network of 20 nodes.  
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Security Parameter 
𝛌 
Needed time in seconds 
3 0.3 
5 1 
8 3 
10 8 
Table 7.1: Needed time to compute the encrypted trust path. 
7.7 Conclusion and perspectives 
In this chapter, we aimed at developing a secure trust based routing protocol using Multi-hop 
homomorphic encryption concept. This contribution consists of two main parts; the first one is 
proposing a model that realizes Multi-hop encryption in an environment using one encryption 
layer. This solution is then used to conceive a secure routing protocol, which bases on the 
personal experience and the valuation of each node regarding the faithfulness of their neighbors, 
to define a trust path. Moreover, protecting the privacy and the evaluation level of these nodes is 
guaranteed, since the solution is based on a FHES. The proposed technique allows nodes’ 
collaborating and sharing experiences in a public topology without disclosing sensitive 
information. 
As future work, we plan to describe a fully scheme that hides the source and the destination 
while computing the trusted path. 
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Chapter 8  
 
 
A fully private Video on-Demand service 
8.1 Introduction 
The popularity of VOD services mandates the need to preserve both the confidentiality of 
information and the privacy of the clients. From one side, service providers seek to protect their 
video store by allowing access for authorized clients only. On the other side, authorized clients 
require that service providers gain no knowledge of the materials they purchase or watch (to 
prevent any kind of tracking or monitoring). This means that we need to implement secure 
protocols that prevent service providers and clients from extracting or accessing important 
information about each other. Such a protocol can be realized by the use of HESs. In these 
schemes it is possible to perform arithmetic operations directly on encrypted operands. That 
means, this kind of scheme enable blind processing, and finds applications in many areas where 
confidentiality and privacy are of major concerns. Securing video streams transported over the 
Internet can be an important area to benefit from the strengths of HESs. 
In this chapter we propose an efficient protocol that relies on HESs to provide a secure and 
private video on-demand service. The proposed protocol allows users to purchase videos from 
networks with low security measures (privacy is not protected). This idea is to encrypt users’ 
queries and blindly (that is, without being aware of their contents) process/execute them, see 
Figure 8-1. We also provide an analytic study to describe the protocol’s data transfer and 
recognize the bandwidth needed to support the whole architecture. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, we review the work related to the 
area of secure video streaming. Section 8.3 describes and details the concept of HESs and 
presents our new protocol. Section 8.4 provides an analytic study and evaluates the performance 
of the new protocol. Finally, Section 8.5 concludes our work and provides future research 
directions.  
 
Figure 8-1: A fully secure VOD architecture. 
8.2 Related Work 
In this section, we review several research contributions that aim at securing video streaming 
over public networks.  
Yin et al. [YIN05] develop a mechanism that combines Content Delivery Network and P2P to 
achieve secure and scalable media exchange architecture. This mechanism uses a selective 
platform that elects two members, namely, the cluster leader and the backup leader. As the 
streaming environment is dynamic, these two members accept or reject new incoming elements 
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forming the group and adapt the network according to changes. Also, the mechanism protects 
media contents by relying on two encryption keys: the session key (SK) and the cluster key 
(CK). The SK encrypts the flow while the CK encrypts the SK itself before forwarding it over a 
secure channel. Both of these keys are then used by authorized members to decrypt streaming 
contents. 
Bachtiar et al. [BAC95] proposed an encryption mechanism, called the bit-serial cryptosystem, 
which can be used to support security in video on-demand systems. Using a pseudo-random Shift 
Register, the mechanism can be used to efficiently encrypt and decrypt stream signals. 
Venkatesh et al.[VEN09] use cryptographic approaches to protect privacy and integrity in a 
video conference system. The technique first relies on a pitch shifting mechanism in which the 
audio stream is simply modified, and then it uses a video obfuscation to ensure efficient privacy. 
Raju et al.[RAJ08] choose RC5 to protect video privacy. While RC5 is a block-cipher encryption 
technique, the authors have proposed dividing each frame into several blocks, and then apply the 
encryption algorithm with a key size of 128 bits to cipher video stream as text data. 
Chen and Lee [CHE05] provide a solution that encrypts only important set of bits and not the 
whole sequences. Such a solution can reduce computing time without compromising encryption 
efficiency.  
Lianet. et al. [LIA06] use selective techniques that encrypt the videos partially (that is, 
encrypting the entire compressed video stream is avoided). While the contribution in [LIA06] 
relies on AVC codec, the data stream is encrypted segment by segment to ensure an efficient 
mechanism. Liu and Koenig [LIU05] use the puzzle game principle to introduce an interesting 
technique for video encryption. The technique suits high resolution streams. 
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Sun et al. [SUN06] propose a content-based authentication solution for video trans-coding with 
which several streaming environments are supported. This solution recognizes the fact that 
streaming data should be digitally converted to support diverse requirements, such as bandwidth 
and terminal capacity.  
Du et al. [DU08] propose a solution that is based on Virtual Private Network technology to 
support a secure conference system.  
Bertino et al. [BER00], Chen et al. [CHE08], and Moon et al. [MOO09], introduce new kind of 
architectures that control video stores and protect video contents against security violations from 
different attacks. 
It is worth noting that none of the above mentioned techniques provide a solution to protect both 
confidentiality and privacy at the same time. This observation motivates the research efforts 
towards devising a system that can address these security aspects together. This system can 
achieve a fully secure and private video streaming. With this system, a client can request videos 
privately without having the service provider reveal the nature of that request. On the other hand, 
the client can have access only to authorized videos such that the service provider protects its 
store.We aim at devising security solutions that target this kind of systems. Our work is based on 
the fully HES proposed in [GEN09a]. 
8.3 Secure and private stream protocol 
The Internet network was mainly built to facilitate the exchange of information among different 
entities. Security measure did not receive a strong attention in that design. This means that the 
regular usage of Internet like browsing, watching videos, and research are not sufficiently 
secured to protect the privacy of the users. The extensive researches in the areas of data 
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warehouse and data mining have shown that these regular users’ activities are very dangerous. 
This is because these activities can be utilized by intruders to track users’ habits and even 
retrieve their personal information. 
In this section we present a secure architecture that can improve the security of public stream 
protocols. Our main focus is on the video on-demand platform.  
In what follows we will reuse the FHE polynomial scheme :  εpk  m = c =  m + 2 ∗ r + pk ∗ q 
while we choose pk and q as λ2 bit value.  
To preserve clients’ privacy when interacting with video stores over public networks (like the 
Internet), we propose the following encryption technique. Firstly, a client checks the video store, 
which keeps its videos arranged by identifiers (IDs), and selects a video. Then, the client fixes 
the parameter of security  λ , and invokes the key generator to produce a public key, for 
encryption, and a secret key, for decryption. After that, the client encrypts the selected video's 
identifier ID, which is encoded under 10 bits, bit by bit as follows: 
𝐼𝐷𝑝𝑘 ,𝑖 =  𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 2 ∗ 𝑟 + 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑞 
Where 𝐼𝐷𝑖  is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  bit in the binary form of value 𝐼𝐷, and 𝐼𝐷𝑝𝑘 ,𝑖  is its encryption form under 
the generated public key 𝑝𝑘. These encrypted values are then sent as an encrypted request to the 
provider that is supposed to stream the suitable video. When the provider receives the encrypted 
request, it proceeds to find the desired record. This process requires an exhaustive search as the 
provider does not know the content of the request. Therefore, the provider is forced to compare, 
bit by bit, the encrypted video identifier, requested by the client, to all available videos in the 
store. The following formula is suitable for that comparison: 
∀ 𝑉 ∈ 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝐸  𝐼𝑣 =    1 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑝𝑘 ,𝑖 ⊕ 𝑣𝑖 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒−1
𝑖=0
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Where size is the number of bits used to encode the video identifiers,IDpk ,i  is the i
th  bit in the 
enquired category, and vi  is the i
th  bit in the video V which is available in the store.  
This formula focuses on comparing two identifiers blindly by checking whether their sets of bits 
are the same or not. This comparison results in εsk  1  if the identifiers are similar or εsk  0  
otherwise. In the exhaustive search through the videos in the store we compare each video to the 
request by calculating 1 ⊕ IDpk ,i ⊕ vi .This search generates a sequence of encrypted bits  Iv , 
where the ith  item contains the comparison result of the ith  video to the query. It is worth noting 
that the provider’s store maintains the data in an unencrypted format. That is, the afore 
mentioned comparison is performed between an encrypted set of bits and plain ones. However, 
irrespective of this fact, the scheme is still convenient since it supports computing over 
heterogeneous values, encrypted and plain.  
To retrieve the targeted video and ignore other ones, we apply this formula to the store: 
∀ 𝑉 ∈ 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝐸 ∶  𝑅 =  (𝐼𝑣,𝑖  ×  𝑉)
𝑖≤𝑉
 
Where R is the encrypted stream flow resulted and requested by the client. This formula uses the 
comparison results to filter out the targeted video by multiplying each element in   Iv  to its 
associated video. This way, the confidentiality and integrity of the provider are also guaranteed 
since we calculate as many stream flows as there are videos available in the store. Thereby, only 
one flow matches the client’s request, while the other flows are just set of εsk  0 .Thus, a simple 
bit-by-bit addition between all of the flows satisfies the query. The latter is sent back to the client 
in an encrypted form. The client can decrypt the received data using his/her secret key and then 
extract the content.  
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From the above description we can see that both sides of the communication (the client and the 
service provider) can preserve their privacy. From one side, the client hides his intentions and 
can still benefit from the provider’s services. On the other side, the provider grants the client an 
access to only authorized products.   
8.4 Evaluation and results 
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed system. The performance is mainly 
dependent on the parameter of security λ; the bigger this parameter is the more secure the system 
becomes. However, the length of this parameter has a major impact on the system performance. 
That is, as the length increases, the operations of the system start to deal with big values (at the 
order of 2λ  
4
 integer value) and this is highly time-consuming. Therefore, this security parameter 
should be carefully configured to balance between the achieved security level and the delay in 
the system.  
Furthermore, we note that for an optimal performance, we rely on Karatsuba algorithm [URL01] 
to have faster computations over big integers. This algorithm allows performing more than 109 
integer operations in less than one second (tested on a PC with a 6 GB of RAM memory at a 
security parameter λ = 3). 
We study the transfer of a video of size 100 Mo (10 minutes of record). Also, we suppose that 
the bandwidth for the normal video stream is 2.5 Mbit/Second. The video ID, which has a plain 
value at the order of 210  bit, is firstly encrypted by the client. This operation results in an 
encrypted ID in which each bit is transformed into a 2λ  
4
 integer value at most. Thus, for an ID of 
10 bits, we have 10 × λ 4 serial bits to transfer to the provider. The provider uses the transferred 
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data to select and implicitly encrypt one plain video content. This implicit encryption is needed 
for the comparisons performed between the encrypted ID and the plain data stored at the 
provider’s store. After finding the targeted video, the size of the encrypted content of this video 
is almost equal to VideoSize ×  EncryptionBitSize (that is, 108  ×  λ 4 bits). 
On the other hand, this comparison is performed after 1014  additions and 1011  multiplications, 
producing a processing time varying from 2 seconds to 12 seconds for λ = 3  and  λ = 6 , 
respectively.  
In Table 8.1, we see the encrypted size as well as the required bandwidth to correctly stream the 
encrypted flow for different values of  λ . These results is performed through the following 
formula: 
EncryptedStream = OrginalStream ×  λ4 
RequiredBandwidth = OrginalBandwidth × λ4 
Table 8.1: Encrypted stream size and bandwidth required for a video of 100 Mega byte. 
In Figure 8.2 we see the bandwidth value for different values of λ.  
Security Level 
Original Video SIZE  
(In Mega bytes) 
Video SIZE using 
homomorphic scheme  
(In Mega bytes) 
Bandwidth Required for 
streaming encrypted 
video 
3 100 8100 202 Mega/Second 
4 100 25600 640 Mega/Second 
5 100 62500 1562 Mega/Second 
6 100 129600 3240 Mega/Second 
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Figure 8-2: The bandwidth required for different security level. 
Furthermore, as the stream content increases after encryption, the cache storage increases as 
well. Then, we calculate the amount of cache as:  
Storage  MB = length  s ×  bandwidth (bit/s) / 8 × 1024 × 1024 
In Figure 8-3, we show the amount of storage needed per λ.  
 
Figure 8-3: The bandwidth required for different security level. 
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Indeed, the encrypted stream is λ 4 time bigger than the original one. However, the encountered 
delays in our proposed system are not of a major concern, given the outstanding advancements in 
networking technologies, especially the emergence of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) that 
supports up to 100 Mega bytes per second. 
8.5 Conclusion and perspectives 
The secure stream transfer over a public network (like the Internet) is a promising concept that 
has major important applications. With this concept, clients’ privacy is preserved such that the 
tracking of their Internet usage can be effectively prevented.  
In this chapter, we have provided a secure protocol, based on a FHES that balances between 
clients' interests and those of the service provider to form a private and secure video on-demand 
service.  
We have described how clients prepare queries, and how the provider blindly processes these 
queries without accessing their contents. We have shown how our protocol highly depends on 
the security parameter λ  and how the configuration of this parameter affects the system’s 
performance in terms of delay. However, the increased delay may not be a major problem given 
the high speeds supported by the latest technologies (like LTE).  
As a future work, we plan to improve the fully homomorphic scheme to support the processing 
of higher number of nodes. 
  
 113 
Chapter 9  
 
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
9.1 Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, we have tackled the problems of secure applications, services and routing 
protocols. We have relied on the HES to design efficient circuits that are suitable to fully protect 
user privacy, and capable of securing the protocols of communication. These circuits have been 
shown to be customizable and implementable in various applications and domains. In this thesis 
we had the following achievements:  
1. We have re-designed basic database queries using FHES. 
2. We have presented an encrypted processor that allows executing programs without revealing 
their details and internals. 
3. We have built a secure architecture for Location Based Services to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our novel approach.  
4. We have developed a secure mechanism for information exchange in ad-hoc wireless 
networks. 
5. We have developed a fully secure mechanism that establishes a secure protocol between 
video requesters and service providers.  
However, these schemes are developed for the “honest-but-curious” adversary model. This 
model assumes that the interveners work in a collaborative mode, even if the harm they cause is 
as simple as data alterations. Furthermore, the performance of these schemes remains under the 
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scope of the research interest as they should be enhanced to support more computations. Finally, 
the adopted FHE actually suffers from the finite number of operations, which requires a re-
encryption procedure to support an arbitrary number of operations. The latter procedure 
contributes to an extra deterioration of the performance. 
9.2 Future Research 
1. The proposed circuits can be extended to face various attacks, even if the server does not 
collaborate faithfully. Also, these models should be able to check whether the performer 
executes the requests as they are or not.  
2. The used scheme can be improved to enable performing the circuits within a reasonable time. 
The improvements may consider enhancing the keys generator by providing a fast and 
efficient system, reducing the length of the ciphertext without undermining the robustness, 
and bounding the noise value after performing the additions and multiplications.  
3. While re-encryption is strongly required to support an increased number of operations, an 
efficient protocol to refresh the ciphertext will have a great added value.  
4. The adopted techniques in this thesis rely on the mono-setting architecture, which means that 
we consider only a single user and a single server. However, the multi-setting topology that 
supports several users, that have access to one shared area, is closer to the reality.  
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